CHAP. VIII. Of Nature's Knowledg and Perception. If Nature were not Self-knowing, Self-living, and also Perceptive, she would run into Confusion: for, there could be neither Order, nor Method, in Ignorant motion; neither would there be distinct kinds or sorts of Creatures, nor such exact and methodical Varieties as there are: for, it is impossible to make orderly and methodical Distinctions, or distinct Orders, by Chances: Wherefore, Nature being so exact (as she is) must needs be Self-knowing and Perceptive: And though all her Parts, even the Inanimate Parts, are Self-knowing, and Self-living; yet, onely her Self-moving Parts have an active Life, and a perceptive Knowledg. CHAP. IX. Of PERCEPTION in general. _Perception_ is a sort of Knowledg, that hath reference to Objects; that is, Some Parts to know other Parts: But yet Objects are not the cause of Perception; for the cause of Perception is Self-motion. But some would say, _If there were no Object, there could be no Perception_. I answer: It is true; for, that cannot be perceived, that is not: but yet, corporeal motions cannot be without Parts, and so not without Perception. But, put an impossible case, as, That there could be a single Corporeal Motion, and no more in Nature; that Corporeal Motion may make several Changes, somewhat like _Conceptions_, although not _Perceptions_: but, Nature being Corporeal, is composed of Parts, and therefore there cannot be a want of Objects. But there are Infinite several manners and ways of Perception; which proves, That the Objects are not the Cause: for, every several kind and sort of Creatures, have several kinds and sorts of Perception, according to the nature and property of such a kind or sort of Composition, as makes such a kind or sort of Creature; as I shall treat of, more fully, in the following Parts of this Book. CHAP. X. Of Double PERCEPTION. There is a _Double Perception_ in Nature, the Rational Perception, and the Sensitive: The Rational Perception is more subtil and penetrating than the Sensitive; also, it is more generally perceptive than the Sensitive; also, it is a more agil Perception than the Sensitive: All which is occasioned not onely through the _purity_ of the Rational parts, but through the _liberty_ of the Rational parts; whereas the Sensitive being incumbred with the Inanimate parts, is obstructed and retarded. Yet all Perceptions, both Sensitive and Rational, are in parts; but, by reason the Rational is freer, (being not a painful Labourer) can more easily make an united Perception, than the Sensitive; which is the reason the Rational parts can make a Whole Perception of a Whole Object: Whereas the Sensitive makes but Perceptions in part, of one and the same Object. CHAP. XI. Whether the Triumphant Parts can be perceived distinctly from each other.