Grounds of Natural Philosophy: Divided into Thirteen Parts: The Second Edition, much altered from the First, which went under the Name of Philosophical and Physical OpinionsNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Grounds of Natural Philosophy: Divided into Thirteen Parts: The Second Edition, much altered from the First, which went under the Name of Philosophical and Physical Opinions
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Physics -- Early works to 1800
There is not any Creature in Nature, that is not composed of
Self-moving Parts, (_viz._ both of Rational and Sensitive) as also of
the Inanimate Parts, which are Self-knowing: so that all Creatures,
being composed of these sorts of Parts, must have a Sensitive, and
Rational Knowledg and Perception, as Animals, Vegetables, Minerals,
Elements, or what else there is in Nature: But several kinds, and
several sorts in these kinds of Creatures, being composed after
different manners, and ways, must needs have different Lives,
Knowledges, and Perceptions: and not only every several kind, and
sort, have such differences; but, every particular Creature, through
the variations of their Self-moving Parts, have varieties of Lives,
Knowledges, Perceptions, Conceptions, and the like; and not only so,
but every particular part of one and the same Creature, have varieties
of Knowledges, and Perceptions, because they have varieties of Actions.
But, (as I have declared) there is not any different kind of Creature,
that can have the like Life, Knowledg, and Perception; not only because
they have different Productions, and different Forms; but, different
Natures, as being of different kinds.
CHAP. III. Of Perception of Parts, and United Perception.
All the Self-moving Parts are perceptive; and, all Perception is in
Parts, and is dividable, and compoundable, as being Material; also,
Alterable, as being Self-moving: Wherefore, no Creature that is
composed, or consists of many several sorts of Corporeal Figurative
Motions, but must have many sorts of Perception; which is the reason
that one Creature, as Man, cannot perceive another Man any otherwise
but in Parts: for, the Rational, and Sensitive; nay, all the Parts of
one and the same Creature, perceive their Adjoining Parts, as they
perceive Foreign Parts; only, by their close conjunction and near
relation, they unite in one and the same actions. I do not say, they
always agree: for, when they move irregularly, they disagree: And some
of those United Parts, will move after one manner, and some after
another; but, when they move regularly, then they move to one and the
same Design, or one and the same United Action. So, although a Creature
is composed of several sorts of Corporeal Motions; yet, these several
sorts, being properly united in one Creature, move all agreeably to
the Property and Nature of the whole Creature; that is, the particular
Parts move according to the property of the whole Creature; because
the particular Parts, by conjunction, make the Whole: So that, the
several Parts make one Whole; by which, a Whole Creature hath both a
general Knowledg, and a Knowledg of Parts; whereas, the Perceptions of
Foreign Objects, are but in the Parts: and this is the reason why one
Creature perceives not the Whole of another Creature, but only some
Parts. Yet this is to be noted, That not any Part hath another Part's
Nature, or Motion, nor therefore, their Knowledg, or Perception; but,
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