Grounds of Natural Philosophy: Divided into Thirteen Parts: The Second Edition, much altered from the First, which went under the Name of Philosophical and Physical OpinionsNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Grounds of Natural Philosophy: Divided into Thirteen Parts: The Second Edition, much altered from the First, which went under the Name of Philosophical and Physical Opinions
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Physics -- Early works to 1800
by agreement, and unity of Parts, there is composed Perceptions.
CHAP. IV. Whether the Rational and Sensitive Parts have a Perception of
each other.
Some may ask the Question, _Whether the Rational and Sensitive, have
Perception of each other?_ I answer: In my Opinion, they have. For,
though the Rational and Sensitive Parts, be of two sorts; yet, both
sorts have Self-motion; so that they are but as one, as, that they are
both Corporeal Motions; and, had not the Sensitive Parts incumbrances,
they would be, in a degree, as agil, and as free as the Rational. But,
though each sort hath perception of each other, and some may have the
like; yet they have not the same: for, not any Part can have another's
Perception, or Knowledg; but, by reason the Rational and Sensitive,
are both Corporeal Motions, there is a strong sympathy between those
sorts, in one Conjunction, or Creature. Indeed, the Rational Parts
are the Designing Parts; and the Sensitive, the Labouring Parts; and
the Inanimate are as the Material Parts: not but all the three sorts
are Material Parts; but the Inanimate, being not Self-moving, are the
Burdensome Parts.
CHAP. V. Of Thoughts, and the whole Mind of a Creature.
AS for Thoughts, though they are several Corporeal Motions, or
Self-moving Parts; yet, being united, by Conjunction in one Creature,
into one whole Mind, cannot be perceived by some Parts of another
Creature, nor by the same sort of Creature, as by another Man. But
some may ask, _Whether the whole Mind of one Creature, as the whole
Mind of one Man, may not perceive the whole Mind of another Man_? I
answer, That if the Mind was not joyn'd and mix'd with the Sensitive
and Inanimate Parts, and had not interior, as well as exterior Parts,
the whole Mind of one Man, might perceive the whole Mind of another
Man; but, that being not possible, one whole Mind cannot perceive
another whole Mind: By which Observation we may perceive, there are no
_Platonick Lovers_ in Nature. But some may ask, Whether the Sensitive
Parts can perceive the Rational, in one and the same Creature? I
answer, They do; for if they did not, it were impossible for the
Sensitive Parts to execute the Rational Designs; so that, what the Mind
designs, the Sensitive Body doth put in execution, as far as they have
Power: But if, through Irregularities, the Body be sick, and weak, or
hath some Infirmities, they cannot execute the Designs of the Mind.
CHAP. VI. Whether the Mind of one Creature, can perceive the Mind of
another Creature.
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