Grounds of Natural Philosophy: Divided into Thirteen Parts: The Second Edition, much altered from the First, which went under the Name of Philosophical and Physical OpinionsNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Grounds of Natural Philosophy: Divided into Thirteen Parts: The Second Edition, much altered from the First, which went under the Name of Philosophical and Physical Opinions
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Physics -- Early works to 1800
Some may ask the reason, _Why one Creature, as Man, cannot perceive the
Thoughts of another Man, as well as he perceives his exterior Sensitive
Parts?_ I answer, That the Rational Parts of one Man, perceive as
much of the Rational Parts of another Man, as the Sensitive Parts of
that Man doth of the Sensitive Parts of the other Man; that is, as
much as is presented to his Perception: for, all Creatures, and every
part and particle, have those three sorts of Matter; and therefore,
every part of a Creature is perceiving, and perceived. But, by reason
all Creatures are composed of Parts, (_viz._ both of the Rational and
Sensitive) all Perceptions are in parts, as well the Rational, as the
Sensitive Perception: yet, neither the Rational, nor the Sensitive, can
perceive all the Interior Parts or Corporeal Motions, unless they were
presented to their perception: Neither can one Part know the Knowledg
and Perception of another Part: but, what Parts of one Creature are
subject to the perception of another Creature, those are perceived.
CHAP. VII. Of Perception, and Conception.
Although the Exterior Parts of one Creature, can but perceive the
Exterior Parts of another Creature; yet, the Rational can make
Conceptions of the Interior Parts, but not Perception: for, neither
the Sense, nor Reason, can perceive what is not present, but by rote,
as after the manner of Conceptions, or Remembrances, as I shall in
my following Chapters declare: So that, the Exterior Rational Parts,
that are with the Exterior Sensitive Parts of an Object, are as much
perceived, the one, as the other: but, those Exterior Parts of an
Object, not moving in particular Parties, as in the whole Creature, is
the cause that some Parts of one Creature, cannot perceive the whole
Composition or Frame of another Creature: that is, some of the Rational
Parts of one Creature, cannot perceive the whole Mind of another
Creature. The like of the Sensitive Parts.
CHAP. VIII. Of Human Suppositions.
Although Nature hath an Infinite Knowledg and Perception; yet, being
a Body, and therefore divisible and compoundable; and having, also,
Self-motion, to divide and compound her Infinite Parts, after infinite
several manners; is the reason that her finite Parts, or particular
Creatures, cannot have a general or infinite Knowledg, being limited,
by being finite, to finite Perceptions, or perceptive Knowledg; which
is the cause of _Suppositions_, or Imaginations, concerning Forrein
Objects: As for example, A Man can but perceive the Exterior Parts
of another Man, or any other Creature, that is subject to Human
Perception; yet, his Rational Parts may suppose, or presuppose, what
another Man thinks, or what he will act: and for other Creatures, a
Man may suppose or imagine what the innate nature of such a Vegetable,
or Mineral, or Element is; and may imagine or suppose the Moon to
be another World, and that all the fixed Starrs are Sunns; which
Suppositions, Man names _Conjectures_.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account