This report does not treat of the particular effects of a qualitative nature that follow from the possible combinations of series of stimuli of different feeling values,--such as the effect of an agreeable touch upon a slightly disagreeable tone, or upon an indifferent color, and so on. All such effects can be traced by rearranging the data already collected, and this may be done in a subsequent paper which may enter also into the theoretical discussion of the whole problem. FOOTNOTE: [Footnote 83: Attention may be called to the fact that this paper arranges the conventional seven degrees of feelings in an order opposite to that of the other papers of this volume; it follows still the earlier traditions of our laboratory, while the more recent investigations call very disagreeable 7 and very agreeable 1; the indifference point remains the same.--EDITOR.] THE COMBINATION OF FEELINGS BY C. H. JOHNSTON The problem at issue in the present investigation concerns the combination of feelings. On the basis of theories as different in many respects as those of Wundt, of Titchener, of Lipps, etc., the feeling-state is always a unity. The affective process for Wundt must be always "coextensive with consciousness." When he chooses to speak of a "mixed feeling," it never for him signifies a "mosaic in consciousness," but is always a new _Totalgefühl_, which "swamps consciousness as a whole." Titchener also believes that with every affective experience an inevitable and pervasive "tilting" of the whole organism occurs. W. McDougall, in his recent Physiological Psychology, makes the general statement that always a "massive state of feeling results" when many sensations are simultaneously excited, and that in such case we cannot "introspectively distinguish the feeling-tone of each sensation." We started to examine by experiment and by introspection which feeling-effect really results from a combination of various impressions with affective tone, and whether it is really impossible that various feelings coexist and remain distinguishable. In case they can coexist, the question arises: What mutual influences can be discovered? For the main part of our study the simplest possible feelings were chosen, because here presumably the subjects will not be forced to grapple with complex personal psychoses, necessarily confusing from their very richness. It was thought that here they could be more nearly normal, naïve, less artificial, and able to a maximum to rid themselves of preconceived personal opinions and unaccountable associations. Here, with simplest stimulations, unsophisticated necessarily, the hope at any rate is that work with a good number of subjects of distinct emotional temperaments may bring to light certain fresh simple introspective facts, which may in their turn offer valuable considerations concerning the psychology of feeling.