understood, they are by no means the same. We find a “corn measure” of value first proposed as a convenient index to the true labor measure. But, strange to say, later we run upon a proposal to take an “arithmetic mean between corn and labor” (_i. e._, between their prices) as the “least defective measure” of “intrinsic value in exchange.” _Cost of production_ was used without any distinguishing adjectives to indicate concepts so distinct as entrepreneur’s cost and labor cost (presumably “disutility cost”). In consequence there arose a dispute, which was at the time nearly unintelligible, as to whether or not profits (_i. e._, interest on capital) are a part of cost of production. 3. In the confusion, a few main lines of thought can be discerned. There is a theory of value _regulation_, and there is a theory of value _measurement_, which is, as Malthus and others pointed out, a distinct thing from value regulation. The classical theory of value _regulation_ was composed of two separate accounts. That is, these two accounts were of distinct origin and nature, and should have been kept distinct. Instead of this they were more or less fused and the relation between them was always clouded. To this fact is due the great difficulty all must experience in reaching a complete understanding of the classical theory. Though it is for this reason very necessary to give the accounts separate names, it seems impossible to find unobjectionable terms. Professor von Wieser, from whom I have taken the idea that the confusion between these two accounts is the key to the history of the labor theory of value, distinguishes them by the terms “philosophical” and “empirical.”[3]