under General Stewart was to march northwards, and, suppressing on the way the Ghuznee insurgents, was to join the Cabul army in a sort of triumphant return to Peshawur. The first part of the programme was carried out. … The second part of the plan was fated to be interrupted by a serious disaster which rendered it for a while uncertain whether the withdrawal of the troops from Afghanistan was possible. … Ayoob had always expressed his disapproval of his brother's friendship for the English, and had constantly refused to accept their overtures. Though little was known about him, rumours were afloat that he intended to advance upon Ghuznee, and join the insurgents there. At length about the middle of June [1880] his army started. … But before the end of June Farah had been reached and it seemed plain that Candahar would be assaulted. … General Burrows found it necessary to fall back to a ridge some forty-five miles from Candahar called Kush-y-Nakhud. There is a pass called Maiwand to the north of the high-road to Candahar, by which an army avoiding the position on the ridge might advance upon the city. On the 27th of July the Afghan troops were seen moving in the direction of this pass. In his attempt to stop them with his small force, numbering about 2,500 men, General Burrows was disastrously defeated. With difficulty and with the loss of seven guns, about half the English troops returned to Candahar. {17} General Primrose, who was in command, had no choice but to strengthen the place, submit to an investment, and wait till he should be rescued. … The troops at Cabul were on the point of withdrawing when the news of the disaster reached them. It was at once decided that the pick of the army under General Roberts should push forward to the beleaguered city, while General Stewart with the remainder should carry out the intended withdrawal. … With about 10,000 fighting men and 8,000 camp followers General Roberts brought to a successful issue his remarkable enterprise, … falling upon the army of the Ameer and entirely dispersing it a short distance outside the city. All those at all inclined to the forward policy clamoured for the maintenance of a British force in Candahar. But the Government firmly and decisively refused to consent to anything approaching to a permanent occupation. … The struggle between Abdurahman and Ayoob continued for a while, and until it was over the English troops remained at Quetta. But when Abdurahman had been several times victorious over his rival and in October [1881] occupied Herat, it was thought safe to complete the evacuation, leaving Abdurahman for the time at least generally accepted as Ameer." _J. F. Bright, History of England, period 4, pages 534-544._ ALSO IN _A. Forbes, The Afghan Wars, part 2._