History of the Conquest of Mexico; vol. 4/4Prescott, William Hickling
History
History of the Conquest of Mexico; vol. 4/4
Prescott, William Hickling
Cortés, Hernán, 1485-1547; Mexico -- History -- Conquest, 1519-1540
The Tezcucan and Tlascalan chiefs now sent to acquaint their troops with
the failure of the prophecy, and to recall them to the Christian camp.
The Tlascalans, who had halted on the way, returned, ashamed of their
credulity, and with ancient feelings of animosity heightened by the
artifice of which they had been the dupes. Their example was followed by
many of the other confederates, with the levity natural to a people
whose convictions are the result not of reason, but of superstition. In
a short time the Spanish general found himself at the head of an
auxiliary force which, if not so numerous as before, was more than
adequate to all his purposes. He received them with politic benignity;
and, while he reminded them that they had been guilty of a great crime
in thus abandoning their commander, he was willing to overlook it in
consideration of their past services. They must be aware that these
services were not necessary to the Spaniards, who had carried on the
siege with the same vigor during their absence as when they were
present. But he was unwilling that those who had shared the dangers of
the war with him should not also partake its triumphs, and be present at
the fall of their enemy, which he promised, with a confidence better
founded than that of the priests in their prediction, should not be long
delayed.
Yet the menaces and machinations of Guatemozin were still not without
effect in the distant provinces. Before the full return of the
confederates, Cortés received an embassy from Cuernavaca, ten or twelve
leagues distant, and another from some friendly towns of the Otomies,
still farther off, imploring his protection against their formidable
neighbors, who menaced them with hostilities as allies of the Spaniards.
As the latter were then situated, they were in a condition to receive
succor much more than to give it.[66] Most of the officers were,
accordingly, opposed to granting a request compliance with which must
still further impair their diminished strength. But Cortés knew the
importance, above all, of not betraying his own inability to grant it.
“The greater our weakness,” he said, “the greater need have we to cover
it under a show of strength.”[67]
He immediately detached Tápia with a body of about a hundred men in one
direction, and Sandoval with a somewhat larger force in the other, with
orders that their absence should not in any event be prolonged beyond
ten days.[68] The two captains executed their commissions promptly and
effectually. They each met and defeated his adversary in a pitched
battle, laid waste the hostile territories, and returned within the time
prescribed. They were soon followed by ambassadors from the conquered
places, soliciting the alliance of the Spaniards; and the affair
terminated by an accession of new confederates, and, what was more
important, a conviction in the old that the Spaniards were both willing
and competent to protect them.
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