History of the Origin, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 2: With Notices of Its Principle Framers — John Shaqi
History of the Origin, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 2: With Notices of Its Principle FramersCurtis, George Ticknor
History
History of the Origin, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 2: With Notices of Its Principle Framers
Curtis, George Ticknor
Constitutional history -- United States
The general principles on which the powers of the national legislature
were to be regulated, were declared with a great degree of unanimity.
That it ought to be invested with all the legislative powers belonging
to the Congress of the Confederation was conceded by all. This was
followed by the nearly unanimous declaration of a principle, which was
intended as a general description of a class of powers that would
require subsequent enumeration, namely, that the legislative power
ought to embrace all cases to which the State legislatures were
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States would be
interrupted by the exercise of State legislation. But the committee
also went much farther, and without discussion or dissent declared
that there ought also to be a power to negative all laws passed by the
several States contravening, in the opinion of the national
legislature, the Articles of Union, or any treaties made under the
authority of the Union.[28]
The somewhat crude idea of making a negative on State legislation a
legislative power of the national government, shows that the admirable
discovery had not yet been made of exercising such a control through
the judicial department. Without such a control lodged somewhere, the
national prerogatives could not be defended, however extensive they
might be in theory. There had been, as Mr. Madison well remarked, a
constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal authority,
to violate national treaties, to infringe the rights and interests of
each other, and to oppress the weaker party within their respective
jurisdictions. The expedient that seemed at first to be the proper
remedy, and, as was then supposed, the only one that could be employed
as a substitute for force, was to give the general government a power
similar to that which had been exercised over the legislation of the
Colonies by the crown of England, before the Revolution; and there
were some important members of the Convention who at this time thought
that this power ought to be universal.[29] They considered it
impracticable to draw a line between the cases proper and improper for
the exercise of such a negative, and they argued from the correctness
of the principle of such a power, that it ought to embrace all cases.
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