History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)Southey, Robert
History
History of the Peninsular War, Volume 4 (of 6)
Southey, Robert
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
of spirit, and the general then perceived that there was no hope of
recovering the day. He therefore commenced his retreat, and ordered
Vigodet, whose division was at this time the least exposed, to bring up
and cover the rear. Vigodet performed this service with great coolness,
recovered and spiked one of the cannon which had been taken, and
began at length to fall back himself in good order. At this time some
ammunition carts, which were blown up on his right, that they might
not fall into the enemy’s hands, frightened the horses of the little
cavalry which covered his own retreat, and the French, taking advantage
of their confusion, charged him vigorously. The second in command
of the division, D. Francisco de Reyna, checked the pursuers, while
Vigodet rallied the scattered horse, and collected about 1000 men,
under whose protection he left the field. They retreated by different
routes to Herencia, meaning to fall back to Manzanares, Membrilla, and
Solana. As far as Herencia the movement was effected in good order,
only a few soldiers, straggling from their ranks to drink at the few
wells in that arid country; but when the van reached Manzanares, a cry
arose that the French had got before them on the road of Valdepeñas,
to cut off their retreat. This false report, either originating in
treason or in cowardice, spread through the troops: from that moment
subordination was at an end, and they forfeited the credit which had
been gained in the action, by dispersing.
Sebastiani stated the loss of the Spaniards at 4000 killed, 4000
prisoners, an immense number wounded, 100 ammunition waggons,
and thirty-five pieces of cannon. The whole of the artillery and
baggage was certainly lost; but the number of prisoners was grossly
exaggerated, because the Spaniards did not disperse till they had
accomplished their retreat; and the French, with that inconsistency
which so often betrayed the falsehood of their official accounts,
admitted that none of their corps could be overtaken. He gave no
account of his own loss; Venegas estimated it at 8000, ... an
exaggeration as great as that of the French general; but that the
French suffered severely was evident, because they were long crippled
for any further operations. Venegas retired to La Carolina, his men
assembled at the passes of the Sierra, and in a few days he was again
at the head of a respectable army. The enemy had now effected every
thing which they proposed; they had driven Cuesta and the British
beyond the Tagus on one side, and on the other had recovered possession
of La Mancha; and the Intruder, rejoicing in the issue of a campaign,
which opened under such inauspicious aspects, returned triumphantly to
Madrid. The disgrace of Talavera sate easy upon the French; ... with
their usual contempt of truth, they affirmed that they had won the
victory; and the situation of the contending armies a few weeks after
the battle gave credit to the impudent assertion.
CHAPTER XXV.
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