that city; to hasten that investment, therefore, and press the siege would be the best service which he could render to the French in Upper Catalonia: this opinion he thought Buonaparte would form, whom the intelligence would reach at Paris five or six days before he had received it at Zaragoza: upon that opinion, therefore, he resolved to act, on his own responsibility; and he had soon the satisfaction of knowing that his conduct in so doing was approved and[25] applauded. His judgment was not less accurate as to what was, ♦MÉMOIRES, 1. 13–18.♦ in this instance, to be expected from the Spaniards, who were still destined to suffer for the weakness of their government, the want of union in their leaders, and the want of system which was felt in every ♦EROLES INTRODUCES TROOPS INTO FIGUERAS.♦ department. Eroles, indeed, acted on this emergency as he always did, with promptitude, and vigour, and ability. Collecting all the force he could, he hastened from Martorell to reinforce the garrison of Figueras, and on his way took the forts which the French had erected in Castelfollit and Olot, and made above 500 prisoners there. Though a considerable ♦APRIL 16.♦ force had already been collected to blockade the place, he entered it on the sixth day after its capture, with 1500 infantry, 150 horse, and about 50 artillerymen, losing on the way some forty killed and sixty wounded; but the French battalion, which endeavoured to prevent his entrance, suffered ♦THE FRENCH BLOCKADE IT.♦ more than a threefold loss. General Baraguay d’Hilliers had by that time brought together about 8000 troops for the blockade, nearly half of which had been called off from blockading the Seu d’Urgel, and had made a circuitous march within the French border. All posts of minor importance they immediately abandoned, retaining only Rosas, Gerona, and Hostalrich, in that part of Catalonia, and even weakening the garrison of Gerona so much, that that place might have been recovered by a second _Rovirada_, had there been another Rovira to conduct one. But there was little concert among the Catalan leaders; it was deemed fortunate that Eroles had not been obliged to require the co-operation of another body, which from its position he might have looked to for aid, because there was ill blood between that body and the corps which he commanded. His arrival was well-timed, for the garrison was disorderly as well as weak, ... more enterprising than wary, ... not to be restrained from making rash sallies against the blockading force; and they had also 1500 prisoners to guard, whom, for their own security, they were compelled to confine so closely, that they were in reasonable apprehension lest disease and infection should be the consequences. But supplies were as needful as reinforcements; wine and oil were especially wanted. The Spaniards, with more alertness than they often exerted, sent off a convoy of stores with one of their