History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
In this state of affairs, the impending fate of the Peninsula was
again averted by the king, who recalled the first corps to the
support of the fourth, then opposed to Venegas. Marshal Ney, also,
was unable to discover the ford below the bridge of Almaraz; and,
by the 11th, the allies had re-established their line of defence.
The head-quarters of the British were at Jaraicejo, and those
of the Spaniards at Deleytoza: the former, guarding the ford of
Almaraz, formed the left; the latter, occupying the Meza d’Ibor
and Campillo, were on the right. The 12th, Cuesta having resigned,
general Equia succeeded to the command, and gave hopes of a better
co-operation; but the evil was in the character of the people.
The position of the allies was, however, compact and central; the
reserves could easily support the advanced posts; the communication
to the rear was open; and, if defended with courage, the Meza
d’Ibor is impregnable. To pass the Tagus at Almaraz, in itself a
difficult operation, would be of no avail to the enemy, while the
Mirabete and Meza d’Ibor were occupied, because his troops would be
enclosed in the narrow space between those ridges and the river.
The duke of Dalmatia, thus thwarted, conceived that sir Arthur
Wellesley would endeavour to re-pass the Tagus by Alcantara, and
so rejoin Beresford and the five thousand British troops under
Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn, which were, by this time, near the
frontier of Portugal. To prevent this he resolved to march at once
upon Coria, with the second, fifth, and sixth corps, to menace
the communications both of sir Arthur and Beresford with Lisbon,
and, at the same time, prepare for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo;
but marshal Ney absolutely refused to concur in this operation:
he observed that sir Arthur Wellesley was not yet in march for
Alcantara; that it was exceedingly dangerous to invade Portugal in
a hasty manner; and that the army could not be fed between Coria,
Plasencia, and the Tagus; finally, that Salamanca, being again in
possession of the Spaniards, it was more fitting that the sixth
corps should retake that town, and occupy the line of the Tormes to
cover Castile.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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