History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Following the French account, three thousand of the vanquished
were slain, and four thousand taken prisoners; and all the
guns, baggage, ammunition, and carriages fell into the hands of
the victors, whose loss did not exceed fifteen hundred men. The
remnants of the defeated army took shelter in the Sierra Morena.
The head-quarters of the fourth corps were then established at
Aranjuez; those of the first at Toledo; and the king returned in
triumph to the capital.
[Sidenote: Parliamentary Papers, 1810.]
The allied troops, however, still held their position at
Deleytosa and Jaraicejo, and sir Arthur Wellesley was not, at
the first, without hopes to maintain himself there, or even to
resume offensive operations; for he knew that Ney had returned
to Salamanca, and he erroneously believed that Mortier commanded
only a part of the first corps, and that the remainder were at
Toledo. On the other hand, his own strength was about seventeen
thousand men; Beresford had reached Moraleja, with from twelve to
fourteen thousand Portuguese; and between the frontier of Portugal
and Lisbon there were at least five thousand British troops,
composing the brigades of Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn. If Soult
invaded Portugal, the intention of the English general was to have
followed him. If the French remained in their present position, he
meant to re-cross the Tagus, and, in conjunction with Beresford’s
troops, to fall upon their right at Plasencia. For his own front
he had no fear; and he was taking measures to restore the broken
arch of the Cardinal’s bridge over the Tagus, with a view to his
operation against Plasencia, when the misconduct of the Spanish
government and its generals again obliged him to look solely to the
preservation of his own army.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. 7.]
From the 23d of July, when the bad faith of the junta, the apathy
of the people in Estremadura, and the wayward folly of Cuesta, had
checked the forward movements of the British, the privations of the
latter, which had commenced at Plasencia, daily increased. It was
in vain that sir Arthur, remonstrating with Cuesta and the junta,
had warned them of the consequences; it was in vain that he refused
to pass the Alberche until the necessary supplies were secured. His
reasonings, his representations, and even the fact of his having
halted at Talavera, were alike disregarded by men who, judging
from their own habits, concluded that his actions would also be at
variance with his professions.
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