Let it be supposed, however, that the strength of the Meza d’Ibor and the Mirabete had baffled all the enemy’s efforts, and that, seeing the allies fixed in those positions, the sixth corps, in pursuance of Soult’s second proposal, had crossed the frontier of Portugal. Sir Arthur Wellesley, contemplating such an event, affirmed that he meant to follow them in any movement they might make against Lisbon; but there were two ways of following, the one by the south and the other by the north bank of the Tagus. Now, if he designed to cross the Tagus at the Cardinal’s bridge, and so, connecting his right with Beresford, to hang on the enemy’s rear, it could only have been while he was ignorant of Venegas’ defeat, and when he imagined the French to have but thirty thousand men in the valley of the Tagus; but they had above seventy thousand; and, without endangering Madrid, they could have invaded Portugal with, at least, fifty thousand men under arms. If, on the other hand, he designed to move by the south side of the Tagus, the French line of march upon Abrantes and Lisbon was shorter than his; and Beresford, who only reached Moraleja on the 12th, would have been cut off, and thrown back upon Almeida. It is true that marshal Ney alleged the difficulty of feeding the troops in the country about Plasencia and Coria, and the prudence of Soult’s project might, in that respect, have been somewhat questionable. But the duke of Elchingen was averse to _any_ invasion of Portugal; and, to an unwilling mind, difficulties are enlarged beyond their due proportion. Moreover, his talents were more remarkable in a battle than in the dispositions for a campaign; and Soult’s opinion must, on this occasion, be allowed greater weight, because the Vera de Plasencia and the valleys of the Bejar and the Gata mountains were certainly exceedingly fertile, they had been little injured, and the object was, not to fix a base of operations, but to obtain a momentary subsistence until a richer country could be opened. Admitting, however, that a march on Lisbon was not feasible at that moment, there could have been no well-founded objection to the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which Soult again proposed. The emperor’s instructions were indeed pleaded; but those were general, founded upon the past errors of the campaign, which made him doubtful of the future; they were not applicable to the peculiar circumstances of the moment, and would have been disregarded by a general with a tithe of his own genius. Fortunately for Spain, the intrusive king was not a great commander. When he might have entered the temple of victory with banners flying, he stretched himself at the threshold and slept.