History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 2
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The 4th December the garrison made a sally, in the night, from
the citadel, and with some success; but the walls were opened by
the enemy’s fire, and the next day O’Daly, hopeless of relief,
surrendered with about two thousand four hundred men, of which two
hundred were wounded. Lord Cochrane, also, blew up the magazine,
and abandoned Fort Trinity. General St. Cyr observes that the
garrison of Rosas might have been easily carried off, at night,
by the British shipping; but to embark two thousand five hundred
men, in the boats of two ships, and under a heavy fire, whether by
night or day, is not an easy operation; nevertheless, the censure
seems well founded, because sufficient preparation might have been
previously made.
[Sidenote: Doyle’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The defence of Rosas (with the exception of lord Cochrane’s
efforts) cannot be deemed brilliant, whether with relation to
the importance of the place, the assistance that might have been
rendered from the sea, or the number of the garrison compared with
that of the besiegers. It held out, however, thirty days, and,
if that time had been well employed by the Spaniards, the loss
of the garrison would have been amply repaid; but Vives, wholly
occupied with Barcelona, was indifferent to the fate of Rosas. A
fruitless attack on Souham’s posts, by Mariano Alvarez, was the
only effort made to interrupt the siege, or to impede the farther
progress of the enemy. Lazan, although at the head of six or seven
thousand men, could not rely upon more than three thousand; and his
applications to Vives for a reinforcement were unheeded.
The fall of Rosas enabled St. Cyr to march to the relief of
Barcelona, and he resolved to do so: yet the project, at first
sight, would appear rather insane than hardy; for the roads, by
which Gerona and Hostalrich were to be turned, being mere paths
impervious to carriages, no artillery, and little ammunition,
could be carried, and the country was full of strong positions.
The Germans had not yet arrived at Perpignan; it was indispensable
to leave Reille in the Ampurdan, to protect Rosas and Figueras;
and, these deductions being made, less than eighteen thousand
men, including the cavalry, which had been recalled from France,
remained disposable for the operation.
[Sidenote: Cabanes.]
But, on the Spanish side, Reding having come up, there were
twenty-five thousand men in the camp before Barcelona, and ten
thousand others, under Lazan and Alvarez, were at Gerona. All
these troops were, however, exceedingly ill organized. Two-thirds
of the Migueletes only carried pikes, and many were without any
arms at all. There was no sound military system; the Spanish
generals were ignorant of the French movements and strength; and
their own indolence and want of vigilance drew upon them the
contempt and suspicion of the people.
[Sidenote: St. Cyr.]
[Sidenote: Cabanes.]
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