History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The plans of the English general, were--at first, grounded, upon
the supposition, that the French would follow the right or northern
line, in preference to the centre or southern line of operations,
against the Peninsula, that is, _attack Portugal from the side of
Old Castile_, rather than _Andalusia from the side of La Mancha_. In
this he was mistaken. The movements were again directed by Napoleon,
his views were as usual gigantic, and not Andalusia alone, but every
part of the Peninsula, was destined to feel the weight of his arms.
Fresh troops, flushed with their recent German victories, were
crowding into Spain, reinforcing the corps to their right and left,
scouring the main communications, and following the footsteps of
the old bands, as the latter were impelled forward in the career of
invasion. Hence, the operations against Andalusia so deeply affected
the defence of Portugal, that, on the 31st of January, at the moment
Seville was opening her gates, lord Wellington demanded fresh
instructions, reiterating the question, whether _Portugal should be
defended at all_, but at the same time transmitting, one of those
clear and powerful statements, which he invariably drew up for the
ministers’ information previous to undertaking any great enterprise;
statements, in which, showing the bearings of past and present
events, and drawing conclusions as to the future with a wonderful
accuracy, he has given irrefragable proofs, that envious folly has
attributed to fortune, and the favour of the cabinet, successes,
which were the result of his own sagacity and unalterable firmness.
[Sidenote: Lord Wellington to Lord Liverpool, 31st Jan. 1810. MSS.]
“The enemy,” he said, “aimed at conquering the south; he would no
doubt obtain Seville with all its resources, and the defeat and
dispersion of the Spanish armies would be the consequences of any
action, in which either their imprudence or necessity, or even
expediency, might engage them. The armies might, however be lost and
the authorities dispersed, but the war of Partisans would continue;
Cadiz might possibly hold out, and the Central Junta even exist
within its walls; but it would be without authority, because the
French would possess all the provinces. This state of affairs, left
Portugal untouched; but it was chiefly to that country he wished to
draw the ministers’ attention.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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