To arrive at a sound judgement of Napoleon’s measures, it would be necessary to weigh all the various interests of his political position, but there are not sufficient materials yet before the world, to do this correctly, and we may be certain, that his situation with respect both to foreign and domestic policy, required extraordinary management. It must always be remembered, that, he was not merely a conqueror, but the founder, of a political structure too much exposed to storms from without, to bear any tampering with its internal support. If money be the sinew of war, it is the vital stream of peace, and there is nothing more remarkable in Napoleon’s policy, than the care with which he handled financial matters; avoiding as he would the plague, that fictitious system of public credit, so fatuitously cherished in England. He could not without hurting France, transmit large quantities of gold to Spain, and the only resource left was to make “_the war maintain the war_.” [Sidenote: See Vol. I. p. 420.] [Sidenote: Appendix, No. IV. Sections 2 and 3.] But Joseph’s desire of popularity, and the feelings of his ministers, were much opposed to this system; nor were the proceeds always applied for the benefit of the troops. This demanded a remedy; yet openly to declare the king of no consideration would have been impolitic in the highest degree. The emperor adopted an intermediate course, and formed what were called “_particular military governments_,” such as Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia, and Andalusia; in which the marshal, or general, named governor possessed both the civil and military power: in short, he created viceroys as he had threatened to do when at Madrid; and, though many disadvantages attended this arrangement, it appears to have been wise and consistent with the long reach which distinguishes all Napoleon’s measures. The principal disadvantages were, that it mortally offended the king, by thwarting his plans for establishing a national party; that many of the governors were wantonly oppressive, and attentive only to their own situation, without regarding the general objects of the war; that both the Spanish ministers and the people regarded it as a step towards dismembering Spain, and especially with respect to the provinces beyond the Ebro; and, indeed, the annexing those parts to France, if not resolved upon, was at one time contemplated by the emperor. [Sidenote: Memoires de St. Helene.]