History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 3
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
On the other hand, experience proved, that Joseph was not a general
equal to the times. Napoleon himself admits, that, at this period,
the marauding system necessary to obtain supplies, joined to the
Guerilla warfare, had relaxed the discipline of the French armies,
and introduced a horrible license, while the military movements were
feebly pushed. Hence, perhaps, the only effectual means to obtain the
resources of Spain for the troops, with least devastation, was to
make the success of each “_corps d’armée_,” and the reputation of
its commander, dependent upon the welfare of the province in which it
was fighting. And, although some of the governors, had neither the
sense nor the justice to fulfil this expectation; others, such as
Soult and Suchet, did tranquillize the people, and yet provided all
necessary things for their own troops; results which would certainly
not have been attained under the supreme government of the king,
because he knew nothing of war, loved pleasure, was of an easy,
obliging disposition, and had a court to form and maintain.
I am aware that the first-named generals, especially Soult, were
included by Joseph amongst those who, by oppressing the people,
extended the spirit of resistance; but this accusation was the result
of personal enmity; and facts, derived from less interested quarters,
as well as the final results, prove that those officers had a longer
reach in their policy than the king could understand.
There is yet another view in which the matter may be considered.
Napoleon says he left many provinces of Italy under the harsh
government of Austria, that the spirit of jealousy, common to the
small states of that country, might be broken, and the whole rendered
amenable and ready to assimilate, when he judged the time ripe to
re-form one great kingdom. Now the same policy may be traced in the
military governments of Spain. The marshal’s sway, however, wisely
adapted to circumstances, being still the offspring of war and
violence, must, of necessity, be onerous and harsh; but the Peninsula
once subdued, this system would have been replaced by the peaceful
government of the king, who would then have been regarded as a
deliverer. Something of this nature was also necessary to sweep away
the peculiar privileges which many provinces possessed, and of which
they were extremely tenacious; and the iron hand of war, only, could
introduce that equality which was the principal aim and scope of the
constitution of Bayonne.
[Sidenote: King Joseph’s Correspondence. MSS.]
[Sidenote: Suchet’s Memoirs.]
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