Suchet’s projects were, however, retarded by insurrections in Navarre, which, at this period, assumed a serious aspect. The student Mina, far from being quelled by the troops sent at different periods in chase of him, daily increased his forces, and, by hardy and sudden enterprizes, kept the Navarrese in commotion. The duke of Mahon, one of Joseph’s Spanish adherents, appointed viceroy of Navarre, was at variance with the military authorities; and all the disorders attendant on a divided administration, and a rapacious system, ensued. General D’Agoult, the governor of Pampeluna, was accused of being in Mina’s pay. His suicide during an investigation seems to confirm the suspicion, but it is also abundantly evident, that the whole administration of Navarre was oppressive, venal, and weak. To avert the serious danger of an insurrection so close to France, the emperor directed Suchet to repair there with a part of the third corps. That general soon restored order in Pampeluna, and eventually captured Mina himself; but he was unable to suppress the system of the Partidas. “_Espoz y Mina_” took his nephew’s place; and from that time to the end of the war, the communications of the French were troubled, and considerable losses inflicted upon their armies by this celebrated man--undoubtedly the most conspicuous person among the Partida chiefs. And here it may be observed how weak and inefficient this guerilla system was to deliver the country, and that, even as an auxiliary, its advantages were nearly balanced by the evils. It was in the provinces lying between France and the Ebro that it commenced. It was in those provinces that it could effect the greatest injury to the French cause; and it was precisely in those provinces that it was conducted with the greatest energy, although less assisted by the English than any other part of Spain: a fact leading to the conclusion, that ready and copious succours may be hurtful to a people situated as the Spaniards were. When so assisted, men are apt to rely more upon their allies than upon their own exertions. But however this may be, it is certain that the Partidas of Biscay, Navarre, Aragon, and Catalonia, although they amounted at one time to above thirty thousand men, accustomed to arms, and often commanded by men of undoubted enterprize and courage, never occupied half their own number of French at one time; never absolutely defeated a single division; never prevented any considerable enterprize; never, with the exception of the surprise of Figueras, to be hereafter spoken of, performed any exploit seriously affecting the operations of a single “corps d’armée.”