History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5 — John Shaqi
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5Napier, William Francis Patrick
History
History of the war in the Peninsula and in the south of France from the year 1807 to the year 1814, vol. 5
Napier, William Francis Patrick
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
I say I can oppose these passages from the duke’s letters, but I need
them not. Lord Wellesley, a man of acknowledged talent, practised
in governing, well acquainted with the resources of England, and
actually a member of the administration at the time, was placed in
a better position, to make a sound judgement than lord Wellington;
lord Wellesley, an ambitious man, delighting in power, and naturally
anxious to direct the political measures, while his brother wielded
the military strength of the state; lord Wellesley, tempted to keep
office by natural inclination, by actual possession, by every motive
that could stir ambition and soothe the whisperings of conscience,
actually quitted the cabinet
_Because he could not prevail on Mr. Perceval to support the war as
it ought to be supported, and he could therefore no longer act under
him with credit, or comfort, or use to the country;_
_Because the war could be maintained on a far greater scale than Mr.
Perceval maintained it, and it was dishonest to the allies and unsafe
not to do it;_
_Because the cabinet, and he particularized Mr. Perceval as of a mean
capacity, had neither ability and knowledge to devise a good plan,
nor temper and discretion to adopt another’s plan._
Do I depend even upon this authority? No! In lord Wellington’s
letter, stress is laid upon the word _specie_, the want of which, it
is implied, was the only distress, because bank notes would not pass
on the continent; but several extracts speak of corn and hospital
stores, and the transport vessels ordered home were chiefly paid
in paper. Notes certainly would not pass on the continent, nor in
England neither, for their nominal value, and why? Because they were
not money; they were the signs of debt; the signs that the labour,
and property, and happiness, of unborn millions, were recklessly
forestalled, by bad ministers, to meet the exigency of the moment.
Now admitting, which I do not, that this exigency was real and
unavoidable; admitting, which I do not, that one generation has a
right to mortgage the labour and prosperity of another and unborn
generation, it still remains a question, whether a minister, only
empowered by a corrupt oligarchy, has such a right. And there can be
no excuse for a man who, while protesting that the country was unable
to support the war, as it ought to be supported, continued that war,
and thus proceeded to sink the nation in hopeless debt, and risk the
loss of her armies, and her honour, at the same time; there is no
excuse for that man who, while denying the ability of the country, to
support her troops abroad, did yet uphold all manner of corruption
and extravagance at home.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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