Such was the state of affairs when lord William Bentinck brought the Anglo-Sicilian troops once more to Alicant. His first care was to re-organize the means of transport for the commissariat and artillery, but this was a matter of difficulty. Sir John Murray, with a mischievous economy, and strange disregard of that part of Wellington’s instructions, which proscribed active field operations in Valencia if he should be forced to return from Catalonia, had discharged six hundred mules, and two hundred country carts, that is to say five-sixths of the whole field equipment, before he sailed for Taragona. The army was thus crippled, while Suchet gathered strong in front, and Musnier’s division retaking Requeña forced the Spaniards to retire from that quarter. Lord William urged Del Parque to advance meanwhile from Castalla, but he had not means of carrying even one day’s biscuit, and at the same time Elio pressed by famine went off towards Cuenca. It was not until the 1st of July that the Anglo-Sicilian troops could even advance towards Alcoy. [Sidenote: July.] Lord William Bentinck commanded the Spanish armies as well as his own, and letters passed between him and lord Wellington relative to further operations. The latter, keeping to his original views, advised a renewed attack on Taragona or on Tortoza, if the ordnance still in possession of the army would admit of such a measure; but supposing this could not be, he recommended a general advance to seize the open country of Valencia, the British keeping close to the sea and in constant communication with the fleet. Lord William’s views were different. He found the Spanish soldiers robust and active, but their regimental officers bad, and their organization generally so deficient that they could not stand against even a small French force, as proved by their recent defeat at Alcira. The generals however pleased him at first, especially Del Parque, that is, like all Spaniards, they had fair words at command, and lord William Bentinck without scanning very nicely their deeds, thought he could safely undertake a grand stragetic operation in conjunction with them. [Sidenote: Lord William Bentinck’s Correspondence, MSS.]