To force the line of the Xucar he deemed unadvisable, inasmuch as there were only two carriage roads, both of which led to Suchet’s entrenched bridges; and though the river was fordable the enemy’s bank was so favourable for defence as to render the passage by force dangerous. The Anglo-Sicilians were unaccustomed to great tactical movements, the Spaniards altogether incapable of them. Wherefore, relinquishing an attack in front, lord William proposed to move the allied armies in one mass and turn the enemy’s right flank either by Utiel and Requeña, or, by a wider march, to reach Cuenca and from thence gaining the Madrid road to Zaragoza, communicate with Wellington’s army and operate down the Ebro. In either case it was necessary to cross the Albaracyn mountains and there were no carriage roads, save those of Utiel and Cuenca. But the passes near Utiel were strongly fortified by the French, and a movement on that line would necessarily lead to an attack upon Suchet which was to be avoided. The line of Cuenca was preferable though longer, and being in the harvest season provisions he said would not fail. The allies would thus force Suchet to cross the Ebro, or attack him in a chosen position where Wellington could reinforce them if necessary, and in the event of a defeat they could retire for shelter upon his army. Wellington, better acquainted with Spanish warfare, and the nature of Spanish co-operation, told him, provisions would fail on the march to Cuenca, even in harvest time, and without money he would get nothing; moreover by separating himself from the fleet, he would be unable to return suddenly to Sicily if that island should be really exposed to any imminent danger. While these letters were being exchanged the Anglo-Sicilians marched towards Villena on Del Parque’s left, and Suchet was preparing to attack when intelligence of the battle of Vittoria, reaching both parties, totally changed the aspect of affairs. The French general instantly abandoned Valencia, and lord William entered that city.