At this point I received instructions to endeavor to bring the English press to a friendly attitude in case Austria should deal the death-blow to “Greater-Serbian” hopes. I was to use all my influence to prevent public opinion in England from taking a stand against Austria. I remember England’s attitude during the Bosnian annexation crisis, when public opinion showed itself in sympathy with the Serbian claims to Bosnia; I recalled also the benevolent promotion of nationalist hopes that went on in the days of Lord Byron and Garibaldi; and on these and other grounds I thought it extremely unlikely that English public opinion would support a punitive expedition against the Archduke’s murderers. I thus felt it my duty to enter an urgent warning against the whole project, which I characterized as venturesome and dangerous, I recommended that counsels of moderation be given Austria, as I did not believe that the conflict could be localized (that is to say, it could not be limited to a war between Austria and Serbia). Herr von Jagow answered me that Russia was not prepared; that there would be more or less of a rumpus; but that the more firmly we stood by Austria, the more surely would Russia give way. Austria was already blaming us for flabbiness and we could not flinch. On the other hand, Russian sentiment was growing more unfriendly all the time, and we must simply take the risk. I subsequently learned that this attitude was based on advices from Count Pourtales (the German Ambassador in Petrograd), that Russia would not stir under any circumstances; information which prompted us to spur Count Berchtold on in his course. On learning the attitude of the German Government I looked for salvation through English mediation, knowing that Sir Edward Grey’s influence in Petrograd could be used in the cause of peace. I therefore, availed myself of my friendly relations with the Minister to ask him confidentially to advise moderation in Russia in case Austria demanded satisfaction from the Serbians, as it seemed likely she would. The English press was quiet at first, and friendly to Austria, the assassination being generally condemned. By degrees, however, more and more voices made themselves heard, in the sense that, however necessary it might be to take cognizance of the crime, any exploitation of it for political ends was unjustifiable. Moderation was enjoined upon Austria. When the ultimatum came out, all the papers, with the exception of the _Standard_, were unanimous in condemning it. The whole world, outside of Berlin and Vienna, realized that it meant war, and a world war too. The English fleet, which happened to have been holding a naval review, was not demobilized.