The British Government labored to make the Serbian reply conciliatory, and “the Serbian answer was in keeping with the British efforts.” Sir Edward Grey then proposed his plan of mediation upon the two points which Serbia had not wholly conceded. Prince Lichnowsky writes: Mr. Cambon (for France), Marquis Imperiali (for Italy), and I were to meet, with Sir Edward in the chair, and it would have been easy to work out a formula for the debated points, which had to do with the co-operation of imperial and royal officials in the inquiries to be conducted at Belgrade. By the exercise of good-will everything could have been settled in one or two sittings, and the mere acceptance of the British proposal would have relieved the strain and further improved our relations with England. I seconded this plan with all my energies. In vain. I was told (by Berlin) that it would be against the dignity of Austria. Of course, all that was needed was one hint from Berlin to Count Berchtold (the Austrian Foreign Minister); he would have satisfied himself with a diplomatic triumph and rested on the Serbian answer. That hint was never given. On the contrary, pressure was brought in favor of war.... After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come forward with our proposal. We insisted on war. No other answer could I get (from Berlin) than that it was a colossal condescension on the part of Austria not to contemplate any acquisition of territory. Sir Edward justly pointed out that one could reduce a country to vassalage without acquiring territory; that Russia would see this, and regard it as a humiliation not to be put up with. The impression grew stronger and stronger that we were bent on war. Otherwise our attitude toward a question in which we were not directly concerned was incomprehensible. The insistent requests and well-defined declarations of M. Sasanof, the Czar’s positively humble telegrams, Sir Edward’s repeated proposals, the warnings of Marquis San Guiliano and of Bollati, my own pressing admonitions were all of no avail. Berlin remained inflexible--Serbia must be slaughtered. Then, on the 29th, Sir Edward decided upon his well-known warning. I told him I had always reported (to Berlin) that we should have to reckon with English opposition if it came to a war with France. Time and again the Minister said to me, “If war breaks out it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen.” And now events moved rapidly. Count Berchtold at last decided to come around, having up to that point played the rôle of “Strong man” under guidance of Berlin. Thereupon we (in answer to Russia’s mobilization) sent our ultimatum and declaration of war--after Russia had spent a whole week in fruitless negotiation and waiting.