His estimate of the German losses was: two battleships of the dreadnought type, one of the Deutschland type, which was seen to sink; the battle cruiser Lützow, admitted by the Germans; one battle cruiser of the dreadnought type, one battle cruiser seen to be so severely damaged that its return was extremely doubtful; five light cruisers, seen to sink--one of them possibly a battleship; six destroyers seen to sink, three destroyers so damaged that it was doubtful if they would be able to reach port, and a submarine sunk. The official German report admitted only eleven ships sunk; the first British report placed the total at eighteen, but Admiral Jellicoe enumerated twenty-one German vessels as probably lost. The Admiral paid a fine tribute to the German naval men: “The enemy,” he said, “fought with the gallantry that was expected of him. We particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled German light cruiser which passed down the British line shortly after the deployment under a heavy fire, which was returned by the only gun left in action. The conduct of the officers and men was entirely beyond praise. On all sides it is reported that the glorious traditions of the past were most worthily upheld; whether in the heavy ships, cruisers, light cruisers, or destroyers, the same admirable spirit prevailed. The officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all. I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the fleet filled me.” At daylight on the 1st of June the British battle fleet, being southward of Horn Reef, turned northward in search of the enemy vessels. The visibility early on the first of June was three to four miles less than on May 31st, and the torpedo-boat destroyers, being out of visual touch, did not rejoin the fleet until 9 A. M. The British fleet remained in the proximity of the battlefield and near the line of approach to the German ports until 11 A. M., in spite of the disadvantage of long distances from fleet bases and the danger incurred in waters adjacent to the enemy’s coasts from submarines and torpedo craft. The enemy, however, made no sign, and the admiral was reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port. Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. The British position must have been known to the enemy, as at 4 A. M. the fleet engaged a Zeppelin about five minutes, during which time she had ample opportunity to note and subsequently report the position and course of the British fleet.