_The Daily News_ of April 8th, referring to this episode and the court of inquiry, says: “Lord Chelmsford seems to have been as unfortunate in the selection of his staff-officers as he was in everything else.” Lieut.-Colonel Crealock’s “statement” is stigmatised as “palpably written to establish a preconceived theory;” and _The Daily News_ says most justly that “Colonel Harness should not have sat as member of the court of inquiry. How it could have been supposed that an officer who had taken so prominent a part in the doings of the 22nd January was a fit and suitable member of a court assembled even to take evidence merely, is more than we can understand. Besides, the very fact of his being a member, we are told, precluded Colonel Harness from giving his own valuable evidence.” _The Natal Witness_ of May 29th, 1879, makes some reflections on the same subject, which are very pertinent. We need not repeat its criticisms on the court of inquiry, etc. but it says: “It is notorious that certain members of Lord Chelmsford’s staff—there is no need to mention any name or names—came down to ’Maritzburg after the disaster, prepared to make Colonel Durnford bear the whole responsibility, and that it was upon their representations that the High Commissioner’s telegram about ‘poor Durnford’s misfortune’ was sent.” How a court of inquiry, assembled without the power, apparently, of asking a single question, was to throw much light on the causes of the disaster, does not appear. Its scope was limited to the doings at the camp; and under any circumstances it could not well criticise the faults of the General. The proceedings of this court of inquiry can therefore only be considered as eminently unsatisfactory. We might here leave this painful subject, were it not for the undisguised attempts that have been made to throw the blame on the dead. In considering the question of blame, we must first put before us the circumstances in which the camp defenders found themselves when they were required “to defend the camp.” Now the orders given to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine are stated by Major Clery, senior staff-officer of No. 3 Column, thus:— “Before leaving the camp I sent written instructions to Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to the following effect: ‘You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn; draw in (I speak from memory) your camp, or your line of defence’—I am not certain which—‘while the force is out; also draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced.’ I told him to have a waggon ready loaded with ammunition ready to follow the force going out at a moment’s notice, if required. I went to Colonel Pulleine’s tent just before leaving camp to ascertain that he had got these instructions, and again repeated them verbally to him.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 81).