As regards the force left to defend the camp, there were no instructions to form a defensive post; the General did not think it necessary, though to him was the almost prescient remark made: “We should be all right if we only had a laager.” He saw no danger; he was about to move his camp on, and a laager would be useless work, so he put the suggestion on one side with the remark: “It would take a week to make.” Thus Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine was left, and he had no reason to anticipate danger, till, almost without a moment’s warning, he found the camp threatened by an overwhelming force; he then, after trying in vain to check the enemy’s right, endeavoured to hold the donga and broken ground close in front of the camp, where his men found some cover; the camp itself being absolutely indefensible.[150] Colonel Durnford, as we have seen, reached the camp about 10.30 A.M., before which time Major Chard says: “The troops were in column ... out of camp,” and he saw Zulus “on the crest of the distant hills,” and several parties moving to the left towards Rorke’s Drift. Colonel Durnford takes out his mounted men to (as he thinks) assist his General, and to see what the enemy is about.[B] Again, some assert that the action was brought about by Colonel Durnford’s Native Horse in the Ingqutu Hills. Even had it been so, yet this officer’s duty distinctly was to feel and reconnoitre the enemy.[151] When the Zulu army moved forward to the attack, he, with his handful of men, fell slowly back, gaining all the time possible for the camp defenders. Taking the whole of the circumstances of the day, we may conclude that, had the enemy remained hidden on the 22nd, we should probably have lost the entire column instead of part; but the account given by an English Officer with one of the troops that first saw the enemy, and other accounts from Zulus, seem to make it clear that the Zulus were moving on the camp when they came in contact with the horsemen. That they had no intention of remaining hidden is shown by their unconcealed movements on the hills throughout the morning.[152] Now, whether these defenders did or did not take the best measures “to defend the camp” when it was attacked, the primary causes of the disaster were undoubtedly these: 1. The fatal position selected for the camp, and the total absence of any defensive precautions. 2. The absence of systematic scouting, whereby an army of upwards of 20,000 Zulus was enabled to approach Isandhlwana on the 21st, and remained unobserved till the 22nd, although their mounted scouts were actually seen by the General and staff on the 21st, watching _them_. 3. The subdivision of the force, and the absence of proper communications by signalling or otherwise. 4. The neglect of warnings given by the events of the day, and messages from the camp; also the withdrawal of a force actually on the march to the relief of the camp. For these principal causes of the disaster, none of those who fell were responsible.