But even after the arrival of this enormous accession of strength, further reinforcements of three battalions were demanded “for reserve and garrison purposes.”—(P. P. [C. 2367] p. 162). At the end of April the effective force was: First Division, Major-General Crealock: Imperial and irregular troops 6508 Native Contingent (151 mounted) 2707 Second Division, Major-General Newdigate: Imperial and irregular troops 6867 Natives (243 mounted) 3371 Flying Column, Brigadier-General Wood: Imperial and irregular troops 2285 Natives (75 mounted) 807 Making a total strength of 22,545 men available for the conquest of Zululand. On the 14th May, Lord Chelmsford reported: “The troops are in position, and are only waiting for sufficient supplies and transport to advance.”—(P. P. [C. 2374] p. 97). The transport difficulties naturally increased with the increasing force. The colony did not eagerly press forward to the rescue, and although transport for service in the colony could be obtained, that for trans-frontier work was not procurable in any quantity on any terms. The colonial view somewhat appeared to be, “No government has power, either legally or morally, to force any man to perform acts detrimental to his own interest.” No doubt the colony felt itself more secure whilst the troops remained within its borders, and naturally was not anxious to assist in their departure; and it may have thought the war “was an Imperial concern, brought about by an Imperial functionary;” and therefore the Empire should be left “to worry out the affair for itself;” as remarked by a colonial paper at the time.