Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
Although boys have generally a less impressionable social self than
girls, there is great difference among them in this regard. Some of them
have a marked tendency to _finesse_ and posing, while others have almost
none. The latter have a less vivid personal imagination; they are
unaffected chiefly, perhaps, because they have no vivid idea of how they
seem to others, and so are not moved to seem rather than to be; they are
unresentful of slights because they do not feel them, not ashamed or
jealous or vain or proud or remorseful, because all these imply
imagination of another’s mind. I have known children who showed no
tendency whatever to lie; in fact, could not understand the nature or
object of lying or of any sort of concealment, as in such games as
hide-and-coop. This excessively simple way of looking at things may come
from unusual absorption in the observation and analysis of the
impersonal, as appeared to be the case with R., whose interest in other
facts and their relations so much preponderated over his interest in
personal attitudes that there was no temptation to sacrifice the former
to the latter. A child of this sort gives the impression of being
non-moral; he neither sins nor repents, and has not the knowledge of
good and evil. We eat of the tree of this knowledge when we begin to
imagine the minds of others, and so become aware of that conflict of
personal impulses which conscience aims to allay.
Simplicity is a pleasant thing in children, or at any age, but it is not
necessarily admirable, nor is affectation altogether a thing of evil. To
be normal, to be at home in the world, with a prospect of power,
usefulness, or success, the person must have that imaginative insight
into other minds that underlies tact and _savoir faire_, morality, and
beneficence. This insight involves sophistication, some understanding
and sharing of the clandestine impulses of human nature. A simplicity
that is merely the lack of this insight indicates a sort of defect.
There is, however, another kind of simplicity, belonging to a character
that is subtle and sensitive, but has sufficient force and mental
clearness to keep in strict order the many impulses to which it is open,
and so preserve its directness and unity. One may be simple like Simple
Simon, or in the sense that Emerson meant when he said, “To be simple is
to be great.” Affectation, vanity and the like, indicate the lack of
proper assimilation of the influences arising from our sense of what
others think of us. Instead of these influences working upon the
individual gradually and without disturbing his equilibrium, they
overbear him so that he appears to be not himself, posing, out of
function, and hence silly, weak, contemptible. The affected smile, the
“foolish face of praise” is a type of all affectation, an external,
put-on thing, a weak and fatuous petition for approval. Whenever one is
growing rapidly, learning eagerly, preoccupied with strange ideals, he
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