Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
Idealism in this vague form has neither first, second, nor third person.
It is simply an impression of the desirable in personality, and is
impulsively applied to your conduct, my conduct, or his conduct, as the
case may be. The sentiment occurs to us, and the connection in which it
occurs determines its moral application. We sometimes speak as if it
required an unusual effort of virtue to apply the same standards to
ourselves as to others; and so it does, in one sense; but in another it
is easier and more common to do this than not to do it. The simplest
thing, as regards the mental process concerned, is to take ideas of
conduct as they come, without thinking specially where they come from,
and judge them by the standard that conscience presents to us. Injustice
and personal wrong of all sorts, as between one’s self and others,
commonly consist, not in imagining the other man’s point of view and
refusing to give it weight; but in not imagining it, not admitting him
to the tribunal at all. It is in exerting the imagination that the
effort of virtue comes in. One who entertains the thought and feeling of
others can hardly refuse them justice; he has made them a part of
himself. There is, as we have seen, no first or second person about a
sentiment; if it is alive in the mind that is all there is to the
matter.
It is perhaps the case, however, that almost every person of imagination
has at times a special and somewhat definite ideal self, concerning
which he has the “my” feeling, and which he would not use in judging
others. It is, like all ideals, a product of constructive imagination
working upon experience. It represents what we should like to see
ourselves, and has an especially vigorous and varied life in early
youth, when the imagination projects models to match each new aspiration
that gains power over it. In a study of the “Continued Stories” of
children, by Mabel W. Learoyd, many interesting facts are given
illustrating sustained self-idealization. These continued stories are
somewhat consecutive series of imaginations on the part of the young,
recalled and described at a later period. Two-thirds are said to embody
an ideal, and the author, in an idealized form, is the hero of many of
them.[103] An instance of this same process continued into old age is
the fact mentioned by Mr. E. W. Emerson in his “Emerson in
Concord,”[104] that the poet’s diary contains frequent allusion to one
Osman, who stands for an ideal self, a more perfect Emerson of his
aspiration.
It would always be found, I think, that our ideal self is constructed
chiefly out of ideas about us attributed to other people. We can hardly
get any distinct view of ourselves except in this way, that is by
placing ourselves at the standpoint of someone else. The impressions
thus gained are worked over and over, like other mental material, and,
according to the imaginative vigor of the mind, more or less
reorganized, and projected as an ideal.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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