Human nature and the social orderCooley, Charles Horton
Science
Human nature and the social order
Cooley, Charles Horton
Individualism; Social psychology; Sociology
As many people have the impression that the verifiable self, the object
that we name with “I,” is usually the material body, it may be well to
say that this impression is an illusion, easily dispelled by anyone who
will undertake a simple examination of facts. It is true that when we
philosophize a little about “I” and look around for a tangible object to
which to attach it, we soon fix upon the material body as the most
available _locus_; but when we use the word naïvely, as in ordinary
speech, it is not very common to think of the body in connection with
it; not nearly so common as it is to think of other things. There is no
difficulty in testing this statement, since the word “I” is one of the
commonest in conversation and literature, so that nothing is more
practicable than to study its meaning at any length that may be desired.
One need only listen to ordinary speech until the word has occurred,
say, a hundred times, noting its connections, or observe its use in a
similar number of cases by the characters in a novel. Ordinarily it will
be found that in not more than ten cases in a hundred does “I” have
reference to the body of the person speaking. It refers chiefly to
opinions, purposes, desires, claims, and the like, concerning matters
that involve no thought of the body. _I_ think or feel so and so; _I_
wish or intend so and so; _I_ want this or that; are typical uses, the
self-feeling being associated with the view, purpose, or object
mentioned. It should also be remembered that “my” and “mine” are as much
the names of the self as “I” and these, of course, commonly refer to
miscellaneous possessions.
I had the curiosity to attempt a rough classification of the first
hundred “I’s” and “me’s” in Hamlet, with the following results. The
pronoun was used in connection with perception, as “I hear,” “I see,”
fourteen times; with thought, sentiment, intention, etc., thirty-two
times; with wish, as “I pray you,” six times; as speaking—“I’ll speak to
it”—sixteen times; as spoken to, twelve times; in connection with
action, involving perhaps some vague notion of the body, as “I came to
Denmark,” nine times; vague or doubtful, ten times; as equivalent to
bodily appearance—“No more like my father than I to Hercules”—once. Some
of the classifications are arbitrary, and another observer would
doubtless get a different result; but he could not fail, I think, to
conclude that Shakespeare’s characters are seldom thinking of their
bodies when they say “I” or “me.” And in this respect they appear to be
representative of mankind in general.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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