alike, and twice two and four are equal--so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of personal identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those two moments, that is, the present and that immediately past; or the present and that of a month, a year, or twenty years past. Or in other words, by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the same self. But the consciousness of what is past, does thus ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say that it _makes_ personal identity, is to say that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action but what he can remember, and none but what he reflects upon. And one should really think it self evident that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot _constitute_ personal identity, any more than knowledge in any other case can constitute the truth which it presupposes.” If this account of personal identity be just, then, by the doctrine here opposed, death puts an end to it. Affection, thought, intelligence, consciousness, all are no more, and therefore the person is no more. And as he is no more, nothing can be his. Now existence is entitled to no reward, deserves no punishment: is guilty of nothing and accountable for nothing. In a future day something may be raised up just like him in body and natural faculties of mind. But for this something, creation, not resurrection, is the appropriate term. Now can we conceive that the person struck entirely out of existence a thousand years ago, and this person newly created in his likeness, should be one and the same? No, we can as well conceive that two small houses built a thousand miles apart, and entirely resembling each other, are one and the same house. These new persons, if they reason, as some of us do, will think it somewhat strange that they should be accountable for crimes said to have been committed by them long before they were created. This doctrine, however, affords comfort and encouragement to all distinction of sinners in this world. Our punishment in a future state, say they, will not be inflicted upon _us_, (for after death we shall exist no more) but upon our representatives who shall bear our names, and be made to think that they were we. Let us then eat and drink, for to-morrow we die. Let us imitate those noble animals around us, which innocently deceive, kill and take possession; for to-morrow we shall exist no longer. What a foul reproach then does this doctrine exhibit against the wisdom and equity of the righteous Governor of the world? We now attend to the language of scripture respecting this opinion. The parable of the rich man and Lazarus, is grounded on the hypothesis that some persons are happy or miserable in the separate state, while others are living in the present world. The text, “Absent from the body and present with the Lord,” by the subtle philosophy