THE EARL OF LYTTON: ... And now, my Lords, allow me to recapitulate the conclusions which appear to me established by the facts to which I have solicited your attention. On the strength of these facts I affirm once more that Russian influence at Cabul did not commence with the Stolieteff mission, and that it did not cease with the withdrawal of that mission. I affirm that for all practical purposes the Ameer of Cabul had ceased to be the friend and ally of England, and that he had virtually become the friend and ally of Russia at least three years before I had any dealings with His Highness, or any connection with the government of India. I affirm that the sole cause of the late Afghan war was a Russian intrigue of long duration, for purposes which it was the imperative duty of the Government of India to oppose at any cost. And, finally, I affirm that the establishment of Russian influence was caused by the collapse and paralysis of British influence at Cabul, and that this was the natural result of the deplorable policy to which Her Majesty's Government are now so eagerly reverting.... Surely, my Lords, prevention is better than cure. Surely it is wiser and safer to stay at Candahar, whence we can exclude Russian influence from Herat by peaceably extending our own influence in that direction, than to retire to the Indus, and there passively await an event which is to involve us in a great European war, for the purpose of undoing what could not otherwise have been done in a remote corner of Asia. The noble Duke, the Lord Privy Seal, has expressed his astonishment at the prodigious importance I now attach to the retention of Candahar, because, he says, I did not hold that opinion till a late period of my Viceroyalty. That is true--I did not. But in the statement which elicited this remark I thought I had explained the reason why. I can sincerely assure your Lordships that the late Government of India was not an annexationist Government. As long as we had any reasonable hope of loyalty on the part of Yakub Khan, or of the observance of the Gandamak Treaty, which gave us moral guarantees of adequate control over Afghanistan, our wish was not to weaken but to strengthen the Cabul Power. But the whole situation, and our duty concerning it, were changed irrevocably by the atrocious crime which compelled us to occupy Cabul, and by the revelations discovered at Cabul, and now known to your Lordships, of the extent to which Russian influence had penetrated to the very heart of the country. My Lords, it then seemed to my colleagues in the Government of India, and it still seems to me, that the only practical means of counteracting the dangerous Russian influence at Cabul would be to assume ourselves over Western Afghanistan a controlling and commanding position, not dependent on the good or bad faith of any Cabul ruler. Such control can only be exercised from Candahar. The history of the last eight years clearly shows,