not merely that the Russian Power is approaching, and must approach, towards India, but that Russia has long sought, is still seeking, and will continue to seek, great political influence over Afghanistan; that this influence has already found a fulcrum at Cabul, and that it must be a permanent source of disquiet to the Government of India, whenever she wishes to embarrass British policy in Europe. Therefore, for the safety of the British Power in India, it is indispensable that the Government of India shall have the means of preventing--at all events, of counteracting--Russian influence in Afghanistan. It is absurd to suppose that you can have any controlling power over a country in which you have no _locus standi_ at all. Now amongst the arrangements contemplated by Her Majesty's Government after the evacuation of Candahar, where do they expect to find a _locus standi_ in Afghanistan? I do not see where.... Great as are the undisputed strategical advantages of Candahar, the late Government of India did not regard the retention of it primarily, or mainly, as a military question. We felt that it would give us a political and commercial control over Western Afghanistan up to Herat so complete that we might contemplate with unconcern the course of events at Cabul. If you retain Candahar, and hold it firmly and fearlessly, then you may view with indifference the uncertain faith and fate of Cabul rulers, and the certain advance of the Russian Power. If you retain Candahar, and administer it wisely, you will replace anarchy and bloodshed and difficulty and uncertainty on your own border by peace and prosperity; and if you connect Candahar by rail with the Valley of the Indus, you will be able to sweep the whole commerce of Central Asia, vastly augmented by the beneficent protection of a strong, a settled, and a civilized Government, into the harbours of Kurrachee and Calcutta, and thence into the ports of Liverpool and London. But, my Lords, you cannot do all this unless you retain a garrison in Candahar.... If you accept the conclusion admitted by the noble Duke, and affirmed by every Indian statesman, that Afghanistan must on no account be permitted to remain under the forbidden influence of Russia, then, my Lords, for the enforcement of that conclusion you must choose between the retention of Candahar and reliance on the instructions said to have been issued to General Kauffman "not to do it again." There is no alternative. To talk about developing the internal resources of India is nothing to the point. There is no reason why the continued development of India's internal resources should not proceed _pari passu_ with the consolidation of her external securities. But do not fatten the lamb only to feed the wolf. My Lords, all those whose privilege it is to build up the noble edifice of India's prosperity must be content to labour like the builders of the second Temple--working with one hand, but holding the sword in the other to defend their work.