Interpretations of Poetry and ReligionSantayana, George
Religion
Interpretations of Poetry and Religion
Santayana, George
Aesthetics; Literature -- History and criticism; Poetry; Religion
The poet is himself subject to this illusion, and a great part of what
is called poetry, although by no means the best part of it, consists
in this sort of idealization by proxy. We dye the world of our own
colour; by a pathetic fallacy, by a false projection of sentiment,
we soak Nature with our own feeling, and then celebrate her tender
sympathy with our moral being. This aberration, as we see in the case
of Wordsworth, is not inconsistent with a high development of both
the faculties which it confuses,--I mean vision and feeling. On the
contrary, vision and feeling, when most abundant and original, most
easily present themselves in this undivided form. There would be need
of a force of intellect which poets rarely possess to rationalize their
inspiration without diminishing its volume: and if, as is commonly the
case, the energy of the dream and the passion in them is greater than
that of the reason, and they cannot attain true propriety and supreme
beauty in their works, they can, nevertheless, fill them with lovely
images and a fine moral spirit.
The pouring forth of both perceptive and emotional elements in their
mixed and indiscriminate form gives to this kind of imagination the
directness and truth which sensuous poetry possesses on a lower level.
The outer world bathed in the hues of human feeling, the inner world
expressed in the forms of things,--that is the primitive condition of
both before intelligence and the prosaic classification of objects have
abstracted them and assigned them to their respective spheres. Such
identifications, on which a certain kind of metaphysics prides itself
also, are not discoveries of profound genius; they are exactly like
the observation of Ossian that the sun is round and that the shield of
his fathers was round too; they are disintegrations of conventional
objects, so that the original associates of our perceptions reappear;
then the thing and the emotion which chanced to be simultaneous
are said to be one, and we return, unless a better principle of
organization is substituted for the principle abandoned, to the
chaos of a passive animal consciousness, where all is mixed together,
projected together, and felt as an unutterable whole.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account