It was partly to the tendency on Marshall’s part, just mentioned, to give little thought, often, to ordinary conventions, and partly to his kindness of heart, that we should attribute another singular occurrence,--the fact that he attended a dinner at the house of an old friend, one of Burr’s counsel, when he knew that Burr was to be present, and when that individual, having previously been brought to Richmond under arrest, examined by Marshall, and admitted to bail, was still awaiting the action of the grand jury with reference to further judicial proceedings before Marshall himself. He accepted the invitation before he knew that Burr was to be of the company. I have heard from one of his descendants that his wife advised him not to go; but he thought it best not to seem too fastidious, or to appear to censure his old friend, the host, by staying away. He sat, we are told, at the opposite end of the table from Burr, had no communication with him, and went away early. But we must still wonder at an act which he himself afterwards much regretted. CHAPTER IV MARSHALL’S CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS This is not the place for any detailed consideration of Marshall’s decisions. But it would be a strange omission to leave out all consideration of what played so great a part in his life. I must draw, therefore, upon the patience of the reader, while some points are mentioned relating to that class of his opinions which is at once the most important and of the widest interest, viz., those given in constitutional cases. If these matters seem to any reader dull or unintelligible, he must be allowed full liberty to pass them by; but I cannot wholly omit them. The keynote to Marshall’s leading constitutional opinions is that of giving free scope to the power of the national government. These leading opinions may be divided into three classes: _First_, such as discuss the nature and reach of the Federal Constitution, and the general relation of the federal government to the States. Of this class, McCulloch _v._ Maryland, probably his greatest opinion, is the chief illustration. _Second_, those cases which are concerned with the specific restraints and limitations upon the States. To this class may be assigned Fletcher _v._ Peck, the bankruptcy cases of Sturgis _v._ Crowninshield and Ogden _v._ Saunders, and Dartmouth College _v._ Woodward. _Third_, such as deal with the general theory and principles of constitutional law. There is little of this sort; except as it is incidentally touched, perhaps the only case is Marbury _v._ Madison.