Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918Anonymous
History
Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918
Anonymous
Military art and science; Tactics
THE COMMANDER'S INFLUENCE is shown, first in his orders for the
operations, and later by the method in which he employs the forces
retained in his hand for the decisive blow. Personal control, by the
commander, of troops committed to battle, is not only impossible but
should be unnecessary, as such control and leading is the function of
his subordinates, who should be fully acquainted with his intentions
and must be trusted to carry them into execution. Other, and more
important, duties have to be undertaken by the commander, and it is
essential that he should not allow his attention to be diverted from
his main object by local incidents, which are matters for his
subordinates to deal with. "A sound system of command is based upon
three facts: an army cannot be effectively controlled by direct orders
from headquarters; the man on the spot is the best judge of the
situation; intelligent co-operation is of infinitely more value than
mechanical obedience" ("The Science of War"). A campaign resolves
itself into a struggle between human intelligences. Each commander
will endeavour to defeat his adversary in battle, and his principal
weapon is his General Reserve. If he can exhaust the reserve power of
his adversary, while maintaining his own intact, he can proceed to
victory at his own time, and he will endeavour to exhaust the hostile
reserves by causing {34} them to be thrown in piecemeal, in ignorance
of the spot where the decisive blow is to fall. During the campaign on
the Western Front in 1918 the Allies were able to conserve their
strength throughout the attacks from March 21 to July 15, and when they
passed from the guard to the thrust they extended their front of attack
from day to day, calculating correctly that this gradual extension
would mislead the enemy as to where the main blow would fall, and would
cause him to throw in his reserves piecemeal.
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