Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918 — John Shaqi
Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918Anonymous
History
Lectures on Land Warfare; A tactical Manual for the Use of Infantry Officers: An Examination of the Principles Which Underlie the Art of Warfare, with Illustrations of the Principles by Examples Taken from Military History, from the Battle of Thermopylae, B.C. 480, to the Battle of the Sambre, November 1-11, 1918
Anonymous
Military art and science; Tactics
"The subordinate commanders must bring to fruit with all the means at
their disposal the scheme of the higher command, therefore they must,
above all, understand that thought and then make of their means the use
best suited to circumstances--of which, however, they are the only
judge. . . . The Commander-in-Chief cannot take the place of his
subordinates--he cannot think and decide for them. In order to think
straight and to decide rightly it would be necessary for him to see
through their eyes, to look at things from the place in which they
actually stand, to be everywhere at the same moment" (Marshal Foch).
Students of military history will remember that the Prussian
Commander-in-Chief and his Chief Staff Officer, during the highly
successful campaign of 1870-71, did not come within sound of the guns
until five pitched battles had been fought by their subordinate
commanders. Outside the fog of battle, with its absorbing interests
and distractions, the commander can retain his sense of proportion[1]
and can decide where and when he will make his final effort. News of
the battle reaches him from his immediate subordinates, and from the
accounts of successes and failures he is able to judge the weaknesses
and strength of his own and his adversary's dispositions, to use part
of his reserves as reinforcements, {35} if he must, or to husband them
with confidence in the success of the operations, until the time comes
for him to launch them for the final blow.
INFORMATION.--In order that the commander's influence may be exerted to
the best advantage it is essential that all vital information should
reach him promptly, and that his orders should be communicated without
delay. Subordinate commanders must keep their superiors and commanders
of neighbouring units regularly informed as to the progress of the
battle, and of important changes in the situation as they occur.
Runners, who can be trusted to carry a verbal message or written order,
are attached to each unit engaged and to its headquarters. Higher
units than battalions can usually depend on the Signal Service for
intercommunication, but whenever necessary, a supply of runners and
mounted orderlies must be available for their use. This ensures
co-operation, and enables mutual support to be rendered. Information
received must be transmitted at once to all whom it concerns, and
orders received from superiors must be communicated without delay to
commanders of all units affected.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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