Lectures on the Philosophy and Practice of Slavery: As Exhibited in the Institution of Domestic Slavery in the United States, with the Duties of Masters to SlavesSmith, William A. (William Andrew)
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy and Practice of Slavery: As Exhibited in the Institution of Domestic Slavery in the United States, with the Duties of Masters to Slaves
Smith, William A. (William Andrew)
Slavery -- United States
There are questions which lie back of this discussion--errors, as I
think, which underlie the popular ideas of both government and rights.
We should not consider that we had fully met the difficulties of the
subject if we passed them by.
Domestic slavery, it is said, is an abridgment of inalienable rights;
and legitimate government is a voluntary concession of certain
alienable rights.
Natural rights are, of course, such as are inherent in the
constitution of man: inalienable, because in point of fact he cannot
be substantively deprived of them. The law which in any case provides
to do this, treats him as though he were not a rational, but a mere
sentient being--and therein alienates his rights. Domestic slavery is
said to treat the slave as a mere chattel, a thing, not an entity, and
hence deprives him by provision of law of the right of being treated
as a rational being as he is, and not a mere thing. This is said,
because it places his time and labor at the disposal of another man.
How far this reproach is just, turns upon a definite answer to the
question--_What are rights?_
“_Government is a voluntary concession of certain alienable rights._”
If this concession be made by the majority of the citizens, the
government is called republican; if otherwise, it is called despotic.
In this theory of government, certain rights are assumed to be given
up, in order to secure other and more important rights. I have shown
government to embody, of necessity, two great abstract principles in
harmonious operation--though, in their essential nature, the one
antagonizes the other. Now the principle of slavery--_control by the
will of another_--certainly operates an abridgment of the exercise of
_self-control_, which is the principle of liberty. And so far as the
principle of slavery operates, in any given instance of government, is
that, in such instance, a giving up, to that extent, of the right of
_self-control_, in order to secure a _right_ to the _self-control_
which remains ungiven up? Is this so? This question also turn upon
the solution of that other question--What are rights?
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