Lectures on the Philosophy and Practice of Slavery: As Exhibited in the Institution of Domestic Slavery in the United States, with the Duties of Masters to Slaves — John Shaqi
Lectures on the Philosophy and Practice of Slavery: As Exhibited in the Institution of Domestic Slavery in the United States, with the Duties of Masters to SlavesSmith, William A. (William Andrew)
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy and Practice of Slavery: As Exhibited in the Institution of Domestic Slavery in the United States, with the Duties of Masters to Slaves
Smith, William A. (William Andrew)
Slavery -- United States
And again, _self-control_, we say, is the principle of liberty.
Practical freedom is the exercise of the _right_ of self-control. How
far does the right of self-control extend? I say that an instance in
which a body of men emerged from a state of nature, (so called,) and
formed a government by an original act, is unknown to history. It
never occurred. Man was placed originally by Jehovah himself under
political law. The very moment that he placed the first being in a
relation to another by giving him a “_helpmeet_,” he gave him a law to
govern that relation, as we have seen; and all the subsequent acts of
men in the matter of government-making, have been such modifications
of the existing form of government as they supposed would better suit
their circumstances. But it is said that when society meets in
convention to agree upon certain principles called a constitution,
under which the laws shall be made, men do virtually, for the time
being, resolve themselves into their original position or state
without government; and that the constitution so formed is virtually
an original formation. Well, for the sake of the argument, let it be
so. When, therefore, society thus falls back upon its original
position, men stand upon the basis of what are supposed their
_original rights_! What is that? Why, the right that each man has to
do as he may please. They form a government: that is, give up a part,
more or less, of their _original right_. Of course a part remains
ungiven up, and the giving up cannot be to secure the possession of
that which is already in possession! What is it that invests these
questions with difficulty? Is it not the ambiguity of the term rights?
Let us then define _rights_, if we would not be for ever entoiled by
these absurdities.
And still again: Is liberty the right of self-control? Is not
man--accountable man--free in virtue of his very humanity? Does this
freedom imply absolute liberty? If so, absolute liberty is inherent in
his very constitution--it is inalienable. What right, then, can he
have to give it up, or any part of it? If so, he has the right to do
that which subjectively he cannot do. If, then, government be a
concession of the _right_ of self-control in this sense, it is the
concession of an inalienable right, and should be abandoned as a piece
of folly.
It is entirely obvious, therefore, that we cannot advance in these
inquiries at all without first settling the question, _What are
rights?_
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