Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)Brown, Thomas
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)
Brown, Thomas
Philosophy; Psychology
But though, in forming the class of our sensations, we derive many
advantages from that full knowledge which the experience of many years
has given, we purchase these by disadvantages which are perhaps as
great, and which are greater, from the very circumstance, that it is
absolutely out of our power to estimate their amount. What we consider
as the _immediate_ sensation, is not the simple mental state, as it
originally followed that corporeal change, which now precedes it; but,
at least in the most striking of all the tribes of our sensations, is
a very different one. We have the authority of reason, _a priori_, as
shewing no peculiar connexion of the points of the retina with one
place of bodies more than with another; and we have the authority
also of observation, in the celebrated case of the young man who was
couched by Cheselden, and in other cases of the same peculiar species
of blindness, in which the eyes, by a surgical operation, have been
rendered for the first time capable of distinct vision, that if we had
had no organ of sense but that of sight, and no instinctive judgment
had been superadded to mere vision, we should not have had the power
of distinguishing the magnitude and distant place of objects;--a mere
expanse of colour being all which we should have perceived, if even
colour itself could in these circumstances, have been perceived by us
as expanded. Yet it is sufficient now, that rays of light, precisely
the same in number, and in precisely the same direction, as those
which at one period of our life, exhibited to us colour, and colour
alone, should fall once more on the same small expanse of nerve, to
give us instantly that boundlessness of vision, which, almost as if the
fetters of our mortal frame were shaken off, lifts us from our dungeon,
and makes us truly citizens, not of the _earth_ only, but of the
_universe_. Simple as the principle may now seem, which distinguishes
our secondary or acquired perceptions of vision from those which were
primary and immediate, it was long before the distinction was made; and
till a period which--if we consider it in relation to those long ages
of philosophic inquiry, or, rather, most unphilosophic argumentation,
which had gone before--may be considered almost as in our own time,
longitudinal distance was conceived to be as completely an original
object of sight as the varieties of mere colour and brilliancy. There
may, therefore--though we have not yet been able, and may never be
able, to discover it,--be a corresponding difference in our other
sensations, which now seem to us simple and immediate. In the case of
sound, indeed, there is a very evident analogy to these visual acquired
perceptions; since a constant reference to _place_ mingles with our
sensations of this class, in the same manner, though not so distinctly,
as in our perceptions of sight. We perceive the sound, as it were near
or at a distance, in one direction rather than in another; as, in
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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