152. At first it belongs to man as against other members of his family or tribe, then as against other tribes, then as against other citizens, which in antiquity still implies great limitations 153. Influences which have helped to break down these limitations are _(a)_ Roman equity, _(b)_ Stoicism, _(c)_ the Christian idea of a universal brotherhood 154. This last is the logical complement of the idea that man as such has a right to life; but the right is only _negatively recognised_ in modern Christendom 155. It is ignored e.g. in war, nor is much done to enable men to fulfil their capacities as members of humanity 156. Four questions as to the relation of the state to the right of man as man to free life. K. _The right of the state over the individual in war._ 157. (1) Has the state a right to override this right in war? It must be admitted that war is _not_ 'murder,' either on the part of those who fight or of those who cause the war 158. Yet it may be a violation of the right of life. It does not prove it not to be so, that _(a)_ those who kill do not intend to kill anyone in particular 159. Or that _(b)_ those who are killed have incurred the risk voluntarily. Even if they have, it does not follow that they had a 'right' to do so 160. It may be said that the right to physical life may be overridden by a right arising from the exigencies of moral life 161. But this only shifts the blame of war to those who are responsible for those exigencies; it remains a wrong all the same 162. But in truth most wars of the last 400 years have _not_ been wars for political liberty, but have arisen from dynastic ambition or national vanity 163. Admitting, then, that virtue may be called out by war and that it may be a factor in human progress, the destruction of life in it is always a wrong 164. 'But if it be admitted that war may do good, may not those who originate it have the credit of this?' 165. If they really acted from desire to do good, their share in the wrong is less; but in any case the fact that war was the only means to the good was due to human agency and was a wrong 166. (2) (See sec. 157). Hence it follows that the state, so far as it is true to its principle, cannot have to infringe the rights of men as men by conflicts with other states 167. It is not because states exist, but because they do not fulfil their functions as states in maintaining and harmonising general rights, that such conflicts are necessary 168. This is equally true of conflicts arising from what are called 'religious' grounds 169. Thus no state, as such, is _absolutely_ justified in doing a wrong to mankind, though a particular state may be conditionally justified 170. It may be objected that such a 'cosmopolitan' view ignores the individuality of states, and could only be realised if they wore all absorbed in a universal empire