171. It is true that public spirit, to be real, must be national; but the more a nation becomes a true state, the more does it find outlets for its national spirit other than conflicts with other nations 172. In fact the identification of patriotism with military aggressiveness is a survival from a time when states in the full sense did not exist 173. And our great standing armies are due, not to the development of a system of states, but to circumstances which witness to the shortcomings of that system 174. The better the organisation of each state, the greater is the freedom of communication with others, especially in trade, which, beginning in self-interest, may lead to the consciousness of a higher bond 175. As compared with individuals, any bonds between nations must be weak; on the other hand, governments have less temptation than individuals to deal unfairly with one another. L. _The right of the state to punish._ 176. (3) (See sec. 156). What right has the state to punish? The right to live in a community rests on the capacity to act for the common good, and implies the right to protect such action from interference 177. A detailed theory of punishment implies a detailed theory of rights. Here we can only deal with principles 178. Is punishment _retributive_? Not in the sense that it carries on a supposed 'right' of private vengeance, for no such 'right' can exist 179. The most rudimentary 'right' of vengeance implies social recognition and regulation, in early times by the family 180. And its development up to the stage at which the state alone punishes is the development of a principle implied from the first 181. But if punishment excludes private vengeance, how can it be retributory at all? And how can a wrong _to society_ be requited? 182. When a wrong is said to be 'done to society,' it does not mean that a feeling of vindictiveness is excited in the society 183. The popular indignation against a great criminal is an expression, not of individual desire for vengeance, but of the demand that the criminal should have his due 184. And this does not mean an equivalent amount of suffering; nor such suffering as has been found by experience to deter men from the crime 185. Punishment, to be _just_, implies _(a)_ that the person punished can understand what _right_ means, and _(b)_ that it is some understood _right_ that he has violated 186. He will then recognise that the punishment is his own act returning on himself; (it is in a different sense that the physical consequences of immorality are spoken of as a 'punishment') 187. Punishment may be said to be_ preventive_, if it be remembered _(a)_ that _what_ it 'prevents' must be the violation of a real right, and _(b)_ that the _means by which_ it 'prevents' must be really necessary 188. Does our criterion of the justice of punishment give any practical help in apportioning it?