Transcriber's Note: each of Green's footnotes has been placed after the paragraph to which it refers, and renumbered accordingly. The footnotes added by R.L. Nettleship are treated the same way, remain in the square brackets with which he distinguished them, and are marked 'RLN'. The transcriber has added a few footnotes, mainly explaining Greek words in the text. These are also in square brackets, marked 'Tr'. CONTENTS ON THE DIFFERENT SENSES OF 'FREEDOM' AS APPLIED TO WILL AND TO THE MORAL PROGRESS OF MAN. 1. In one sense (as being search for _self_-satisfaction) _all_ will is free; in another (as the satisfaction sought is or is not real) it may or may not be free 2. As applied to the inner life 'freedom' always implies a metaphor. Senses of this metaphor in Plato, the Stoics, St. Paul 3. St. Paul and Kant. It would seem that with Kant 'freedom' means merely consciousness of the _possibility_ of it, ('knowledge of sin') 4. Hegel's conception of freedom as objectively realised in the state 5. It is true in so far as society does supply to the individual concrete interests which tend to satisfy the desire for perfection 6. Though (like the corresponding conception in St. Paul) it is not and could not be realised in any actual human society 7. In all these uses 'freedom' means, not mere self-determination or acting on preference, but a particular kind of this 8. The extension of the term from the outer to the inner relations of life, though a natural result of reflection, is apt to be misleading 9. Thus the question, Is a man free? which may be properly asked in regard to his _actions_, cannot be asked in the same sense in regard to his _will_ 10. The failure to see this has led to the errors (1) of regarding motive as something apart from and acting on will, (2) of regarding will as independent of motive 11. Thus the fact that a man, _being what he is, must_ act in a certain way, is construed into the negation of freedom 12. And to escape this negation recourse is had to the notion of an unmotived will, which is really no will at all 13. The truth is that the will is the man, and that the will cannot be rightly spoken of as 'acting on' its objects or _vice versa_, because they are neither anything without the other 14. If however the question be persisted in, Has a man power over his will? the answer must be both 'yes' and 'no' 15. 'Freedom' has been taken above (as by English psychologists generally) as applying to will, whatever the character of the object willed 16. If taken (as by the Stoics, St. Paul, Kant (generally), and Hegel) as applying only to _good_ will, it must still be recognised that this particular sense implies the generic 17. Whatever the propriety of the term in the particular sense, both 'juristic' and 'spiritual' freedom spring from the same self-asserting principle in man