18. And though the former is only the beginning of full freedom, this identity of source will always justify the use of the word in the latter sense 19. But does not the conception of 'freedom' as = the moral ideal imply an untenable distinction like that of Kant between the 'pure' and 'empirical' ego? 20. The 'pure' and 'empirical' ego are one ego, regarded (1) in its possibility, (2) as at any given time it actually is 21. In man the self-realising principle is never realised; i.e. the objects of reason and will only _tend_ to coincide 22. So far as they do coincide, man may be said to be 'free' and his will to be 'autonomous' 23. The growing organisation of human life provides a medium for the embodiment, and disciplines the natural impulses for the reception, of the idea of perfection 24. The reconciliation of reason and will takes place as the individual more and more finds his own self-satisfaction in meeting the requirements of established morality 25. Until these come to be entirely superseded by the desire of perfection for its own sake, and his will becomes really free. LECTURES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION A. _The grounds of political obligation._ 1. Subject of the inquiry 2. Its connection with the general theory of morals. Ideal goodness is to do good for its own sake: but there must be acts considered good on other grounds before they can be done for the sake of their goodness 3. When, however, the ideal comes to be recognised as the ideal, the lower interests and rules must be criticised and revised by it 4. The criticism of interests will yield a 'theory of moral sentiments'; that of rules will relate (1) to positive law, (2) to the law of opinion 5. As moral interests greatly depend on recognised rules of conduct, and those again on positive law, it is best to begin by considering the moral value of existing civil institutions 6. The condition of morality is the possession of will and reason, and it is realised in a personal character in which they are harmonised 7. Civil institutions are valuable so far as they enable will and reason to be exercised, and so far they answer to 'jus naturae' 8. The essential questions as to the 'law of nature' are, (1) Are there rights and obligations other than those actually enforced? (2) If so, what is the criterion of them? 9. While rejecting the theory of a 'state of nature,' we may still use 'natural' of those rights which _ought_ to be, though they actually are not 10. Such 'natural law' is (as admitting _enforcement_) distinct from, but (as implying a _duty_ to obey it) relative to, the moral law 11. Hence two principles for the criticism of law, (1) only external acts can be matter of obligation proper, (2) the ideal of law must be determined by reference to the moral end which it serves 12. Observe _(a)_ that in confining law to 'external actions,' we mean by 'actions' _intentions_, without which there is properly no 'action'