Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard BosanquetGreen, Thomas Hill
Philosophy
Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation: Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet
Green, Thomas Hill
Liberty; Natural law; Political obligation
On the other hand, that the wife should be bound indissolubly by
the marriage-tie to an unfaithful husband (or _vice versa_), is a
violation of the right of wife (or husband, as the case may be),
because on the one hand the restraint which makes her liable to be
used physically as the instrument of the husband's pleasures, when
there is no longer reciprocal devotion between them, is a restraint
which (except in peculiar cases) renders moral elevation impossible;
and on the other, she is prevented from forming such a true marriage
as would be, according to ordinary rules, the condition of the
realisation of her moral capacities. Though the husband's right
to divorce from an unfaithful wife has been much more thoroughly
recognised than the wife's to divorce from an unfaithful husband, he
would be in fact less seriously wronged by the inability to obtain a
divorce, for it is only the second of the grounds just stated that
fully applies to him. The rights of the children do not seem so
plainly concerned in the dissolution of a marriage to which husband
or wife has been unfaithful. In some cases the best chance for them
might seem to lie in the infidelities being condoned and an outward
family peace re-established. But that their rights are violated by
the infidelity itself is plain. In the most definite way it detracts
from their possibilities of goodness. Without any consent on their
part, quite independently of any action of their own will, they are
placed by it in a position which tends--though special grace may
counteract it--to put the higher kinds of goodness beyond their reach.
243. These considerations suggest some further questions which may be
discussed under the following heads. (1) If infidelity in marriage is
a violation of rights in the manner stated, and if (as it must be) it
is a wilful and knowing violation, why is it not treated as a crime,
and, like other such violations of rights, punished by the state
in order to the better maintenance of rights? (2) Should any other
reason but the infidelity of husband or wife be allowed for the legal
dissolution of the marriage-tie? (3) How are the rights connected
with marriage related to the morality of marriage?
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