33. From which it follows that the 'right' of the state against its individual members is only limited by its 'power' 34. And the same principle applies to the relations of one state to other states 35. But, according to Spinoza, though everything is 'lawful' for the state, everything is not 'best,' and the 'best' state is that which secures a life of 'peace,' i.e. rational virtue or perfection 36. This conclusion does not seem consistent with his starting-point, according to which men are 'naturally enemies' 37. From such a 'status naturalis' there is no possible transition to the 'status civilis,' and the phrase '_jus_ naturae' remains unmeaning 38. Spinoza's error of regarding 'rights' as possible apart from society was confirmed by his denial of final causes 39. It was just because Plato and Aristotle regarded man as finding his end in the end of the state, that they founded a true theory of rights 40. Spinoza, however, while insisting that man is 'part of nature,' yet places his 'good' in understanding nature and so acquiring a new character 41. In thus recognising the idea of perfection as a determinant of life, he really recognises an operative final cause, though without seeing its bearing on the theory of right. C. _Hobbes._ 42. Hobbes differs from Spinoza in regarding the right of the sovereign, not as limited by his power, but as absolute 43. Statement of his doctrine 44. He uses 'person,' as in Roman law, for either (1) a complex of rights, or (2) the subject of those rights 45. Though by his theory the sovereign may be one or many, and sovereignty is transferable by the act of a majority, he tacitly vindicates the absolute right of a _de facto_ monarchy 46. The radical fiction in his theory is that there can be any 'right' _after_ the institution of sovereignty, if (as he holds) there is none before it 47. To justify his doctrine of absolute submission he has to assume a 'law of nature' which binds men to keep covenant, while yet he holds the 'law of nature' to be mere 'power' and covenants to be only valid under an _imperium,_ 48. His 'contract' can confer none but natural right, and that is either not a right at all, or (if it is) it belongs to all men, subject and sovereign alike 49. The real flaw in the theory of contract is not that it is unhistorical, but that it implies the possibility of rights and obligations independently of society 50. Though it has not been popularly accepted as regards the rights of sovereigns over subjects, the behaviour of individuals to society is to a groat extent practically determined by it. D. _Locke._ 51. The development of this latter side of it is peculiarly due to Rousseau, but Locke, Hooker, and Grotius have essentially the same conception: Spinoza alone differs 52. Ambiguity of their phrase 'state of nature.' They agree in treating it as the negation of the 'political state.' But if so, contract would be impossible in it