53. Nor could it be a state of 'freedom and equality,' as most of them assume it to be 54. And if this state of nature implies consciousness of obligation, it must imply recognition of social claims, and must therefore be virtually a political state 55. In fact the theory of a state of nature governed by a law of nature, as preceding civil society, must be untrue either to the conception of _law_ or to that of _nature_ 56. Locke differs from Hobbes (1) in distinguishing the 'state of nature' from the 'state of war' 57. He implies (more consistently than Hobbes) that the 'state of nature' is one in which the 'law of nature' is observed 58. (2) He limits the supreme power in the state by the legislature, which holds its functions in trust from the community 59. And this distinction between the supreme community and the supreme executive enables him to distinguish between dissolution of the political society and dissolution of the government, which Hobbes had confused 60. He invests the community with the right of resuming the powers which they have delegated, and thus justifies revolution when it is the act of the whole community 61. The difficulty is to determine when it _is_ the act of the whole community, and on this Locke's theory gives no help 62. The difficulty indeed is not so great as that of conceiving the act of original devolution of power, and is inherent in the theory of contract 63. In the particular case of the reform of the English representative system, Locke does not contemplate the carrying out of his own theory. E. _Rousseau._ 64. Rousseau conceives the community to be in continual exercise of the power which Locke conceives it to have exercised once and to hold in reserve 65. In his view of the motive for passing from the state of nature into the civil state he is more like Spinoza than Locke 66. His statement of the origin and nature of the 'social contract' 67. Its effects upon the individual 68. His idea of the sovereign is really that of a supreme disinterested reason, but he fuses this with the ordinary idea of a supreme coercive power 69. The practical result of his theory has been a vague exaltation of the will of the people, regardless of what 'the people' ought to mean 70. Further consequences of his ideal conception of sovereignty. It cannot be alienated, represented, or divided 71. Thus the 'government' is never the same as the 'sovereign,' and constitutions differ according to where the government, not the sovereignty, resides 72. The institution of government is _not_ by contract, but by the act of the sovereign, and this act must be confirmed or repealed periodically 73. His distinction between the 'will of all' and the 'general will': the latter always wills the common good, though it may be mistaken as to means 74. He admits however that it may be overpowered by particular interests, and so find no expression even in the vote of a general assembly