116. But the theory of contract expresses, in a confused way, the truth that only through the common recognition of a common good, and its embodiment in institutions, is morality possible 117. Thus morality and political subjection have a common source. 118. And _both_ imply the twofold conception, _(a)_ 'I _must_ though I do not like,' _(b)_ 'I must _because_ it is for the common good which is also my good' 119. It is a farther and difficult question, how far the sense of common interest can be kept alive either in the government or subjects, unless the people participates directly in legislation 120. And this suggests the objection, Is it not trifling with words to speak of political subjection in modern states as based on the _will_ of the subjects? 121. We must admit _(a)_ that the idea of the state as serving a common interest is only _partially_ realised, even by the most enlightened subject, though so far as realised it is what makes him a loyal subject 122. _(b)_ That if he is to be an intelligent patriot as well as a loyal subject, he must take a personal part in the work of the state 123. And _(c)_ that even then his patriotism will not be a passion unless it includes a feeling for the state analogous to that which he has for his family and home 124. But are we not again assuming what was disputed, viz. that a sense of its serving a common interest is necessary to the existence of the state? 125. Observe that the idea of an end or function, realised by agencies unconscious of it and into which it cannot be resolved, is already implicit even if the state be treated as a 'natural organism' 126. Such a treatment, however, would ignore the distinction between the 'natural' and the 'human' or 'moral' agencies which have operated in the production of states 127. It may be objected that these 'human' agencies are not necessarily 'moral,' but on the contrary are often selfish 128. But though human motives are never unalloyed, they only produce good results so far as they are fused with and guided by some unselfish element 129. If e.g. we would form a _complete_ estimate of Napoleon, we must consider not only his ambition but the _particular form_ in which his ambition worked 130. And further reflect that the _idiosyncrasy_ of such men plays but a small part in the result, which is mainly due to agencies of which they are only the most conspicuous instruments 131. Thus an ideal motive may co-operate with the motives of selfish men, and only through such co-operation are they instrumental for good 132. The fact that the state implies a supreme coercive power gives colour to the view that it is based on coercion; whereas the coercive power is only supreme because it is exercised in a state, i.e. according to some system of law, written or customary 133. In the absence of any other name, 'state' is the best for a society in which there is such a system of law and a power to enforce it