95. Thus as to question (2) (above, sec. 80), if sovereignty is said to rest on the general will 'de jure,' either 'sovereign' or 'jus' is not used in the strict sense 96. An antithesis between sovereign 'de jure' and 'de facto' can only arise from a confusion between 'sovereign' as = the source of law and 'sovereign' as = the 'general will' 97. Though there are cases in which (in a different sense) a sovereign may be conveniently described as 'de facto,' not 'de jure,' or _vice versa_ 98. Similarly, to say that the people is 'sovereign de jure' is to confuse the general will with the coercive power of the majority 99. Rousseau's confusion is due to the theory of 'natural rights' (that the individual is not bound by anything which he has not individually approved) 100. The individual must indeed judge for himself whether a law is for the common good; but though he judge it not to be, he ought as a rule to obey it 101. Cases in which a doubt may arise 102. _(a)_ Where the legal authority of the law is doubtful, owing to the doubt where the sovereignty in the state resides 103. In such cases the truth generally is that the 'right,' on the particular issue, has not yet formed itself 104. But it does not follow that because the 'right' is on both sides, one is not 'better' than the other; though this may be the case 105. In such cases of disputed sovereignty the distinction of 'de jure' and 'de facto' may be applied, though it is better to say that the sovereignty is in abeyance 106. The individual, having no 'right' to guide him, should take the side whose success seems likely to be best for mankind 107. _(b)_ Another case is where there is no legal way of getting a bad law repealed. Here it is a question, not of _right_, but of _duty_, to resist the sovereign 108. Nor is it a question of the right of a majority, _as a majority_, to resist: it may be the duty of a helpless minority 109. Some general questions which the good citizen may put to himself in such dilemmas 110. They can, indeed, seldom be applied by the agents at the time as they can be after the event 111. In simple cases we may judge of the right or wrong of an act by the character which it expresses, but generally we can only judge them by its results 112. All that the historian can say is that on the whole the best character is likely to produce the best results, notwithstanding various appearances to the contrary. G. _Will, not force, is the basis of the state._ 113. The doctrines which explain political obligation by contract agree in treating sovereign and subject apart, whereas they are correlative 114. For the desire for freedom in the individual is no real desire unless he is one of a society which recognises it. (Slaves are not a real exception to this) 115. And without an authority embodied in civil institutions he would not have the elementary idea of right which enables him to question the authority